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IN THE GLARE OF THE SUPREME COURT:
CONTINUING METHODOLOGY AND




The right question is not whether a state's guarantee is the same as
or broader than its federal counterpart as interpreted by the
Supreme Court. The right question is what the state's guarantee
means and how it applies to the case at hand.
-Justice Hans A. Linde
Oregon Supreme Court'
In interpreting the NewJersey Constitution, we look for direction to
the United States Supreme Court, whose opinions can provide "val-
uable sources of wisdom for us."... But although that Court may
be a polestar that guides us as we navigate the NewJersey Constitu-
tion, we bear ultimate responsibility for the safe passage of our ship.
Our eyes must not be so fixed on that star that we risk the welfare of
our passengers on the shoals of constitutional doctrine. In inter-
preting the New Jersey Constitution, we must look in front of us as
well as above us.
-Justice Robert L. Clifford
New Jersey Supreme Court2
It is a great honor, as well as an important opportunity, to address
the Conference of Chief Justices on the topic of state constitutional
law. The Conference of Chief Justices has played an important role
over the past several decades in the evolution of the new judicial fed-
eralism,3 in which state courts have recognized that their own state
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden.
1 Hans A. Linde, EPluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REv.
165, 179 (1984); see also id. at 177.
2 State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 800 (N.J. 1990).
3 See Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Looking Back at the New Judicial Federalism's First
Generation, 30 VAL. U. L. RExv. xiii (1996).
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constitutions can be legitimate sources of rights beyond those pro-
vided in the Federal Constitution.
4
Fifteen years ago I had a similar opportunity to address the Con-
ference of ChiefJustices, in which I discussed the legitimacy problems
that had arisen during the early years of the new judicial federalism.5
I noted then that charges of unprincipled, result-oriented decision-
making were being aimed at state courts that had interpreted their
state constitutions to provide broader rights than those recognized
under similar or identical provisions of the Federal Constitution.
These charges, often coming from dissenters on the state courts them-
selves, questioned the legitimacy of independent state constitutional
decisions. Partially as a result of these criticisms, I noted that state
courts were turning to a criteria, or factor approach to justify diver-
gence from, or disagreement with, the United States Supreme Court's
interpretations of the Federal Constitution. These concerns have con-
tinued and may have actually increased over the past fifteen years.
The purpose of this Article is to reflect on these developments.
The idea that state courts may interpret their "potentially applica-
ble state constitutional provisions" 6 to provide more, or broader,
rights protections than are recognized by the United States Supreme
Court under the Federal Constitution should no longer be seen as a
cute trick7 or "simply a flexing of state constitutional muscle." 8 It has
now become an accepted, albeit still sometimes controversial, feature
4 In addition to a number of programs on state constitutional law at its meetings,
the Conference of Chief Justices cosponsored the National Conference on Develop-
ments in State Constitutional Law in Williamsburg, Virginia in March, 1984. See DE-
VELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW: THE WILLIAMSBURG CONFERENCE (Bradley
D. McGraw ed., 1985).
5 Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of
Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REv. 353, 356 (1984). I had a similar
opportunity in 1989 to address the Conference, in which I reported on methodology
problems like those discussed earlier and herein.
6 Bruce Ledewitz, The Role of Lower State Courts in Adapting State Law to Changed
Federal Interpretations, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1003, 1004 n.5 (1994) ("The term 'potentially
applicable state constitutional provisions' is superior to terms such as 'analogous,'
'related,' or 'parallel,' which imply a subordinate status for the state constitution.").
7 H.C. Macgill, Introduction-Upon a Peak in Darien: Discovering the Connecticut Con-
stitution, 15 CONN. L. REv. 7, 9 (1982) ("There probably remains some feeling on the
bench as well as in the bar that a state constitutional holding is something of a cute
trick, if not a bit of nose-thumbing at the federal Supreme Court, and not 'real' con-
stitutional law at all."); see also Shirley S. Abrahamson, Divided We Stand: State Constitu-
tions in a More Perfect Union, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 723, 732 (1991) ("Furthermore,
state judges experience a sense of chutzpah in expressing disagreement with the
United States Supreme Court."); Robert F. Williams, The Claus von Bulow Case:
Chutzpah and State Constitutional Law?, 26 CONN. L. REV. 711, 712, 718-19 (1994).
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of ourjurisprudence. It has been correctly noted that the new judicial
federalism is not new anymore.9 So I will hereafter refer to it as judi-
cial federalism.10
Tallies are periodically made and updated of the numbers of
cases in which state courts have, under their own constitutions, recog-
nized rights beyond those in the Federal Constitution." Most of us
have stopped counting. There is continuing evidence of state courts
actively turning to their state constitutions to reach results beyond
those required under the Federal Constitution.'
2
On the other hand, as we have been reminded by Professor Barry
Latzer, many state courts are, after independent analysis of state con-
stitutional claims, deciding to follow United States Supreme Court fed-
eral constitutional rights analysis.' 3 This reflects a maturing of
judicial federalism. Finally, though, many state courts still continue to
collapse state and federal constitutional analysis, and to decide cases
as though the two constitutions were the same.' 4 There is still much
8 State v. Miller, 630 A.2d 1315, 1328 (Conn. 1993) (Callahan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
9 Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword: The Once "NewJudicial Federalism" & Its Critics, 64
WASH. L. Rxv. 5 (1989); Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword: Reliance on State Constitutions-
Beyond the "New Federalism," 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. Rlv. vi (1985).
10 I resisted the impulse to name this article "The End of the New Judicial
Federalism."
11 Ronald K.L. Collins et al., State High Courts, State Constitutions, and Individual
Rights Litigation Since 1980: A Judicial Survey, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 600-01
(1986).
12 See Craig F. Emmert & Carol Ann Traut, State Supreme Courts, State Constitutions
and Judicial Policymaking, 16JusT. Sys. J. 37 (1992) (when state courts base their deci-
sions solely on state constitutional grounds, laws are more often declared unconstitu-
tional than when decisions are based on both federal and state, or only federal,
constitutional grounds).
13 See BARRY LATZER, STATE CONSTrrUTIONAL CRIINAL LAw (1995); BARRY LATzER,
STATE CONsTITUTIONS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1991); Barry Latzer, Into the '90s: More
Evidence that the Revolution Has a Conservative Underbelly, 4 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST.
L. 17 (1991) [hereinafter Latzer, Into the '90s]; Barry Latzer, The Hidden Conservatism of
the State Court "Revolution", 74 JUDICATURE 190, 190-91 (1991); Barry Latzer, The New
JudicialFederalism and Criminal Justice: Two Problems and a Response, 22 RUTGERS LJ. 863,
864-65 (1991); see also Michael Esler, State Supreme Court Commitment to State Law, 78
JUDICATURE 25 (1994).
14 The Maryland Court of Appeals, for example, has taken to referring to similar
state and federal constitutional provisions as "in pari materia." See Hof v. State, 655
A.2d 370, 373 n.3 (Md. 1995); Henderson v. State, 597 A.2d 486, 488 (Md. 1991);
Craig v. State, 588 A.2d 328, 334 (Md. 1991); WBAL-TV Div., Hearst Corp. v. State,
477 A.2d 776, 781 n.4 (Md. 1984). This approach is criticized in Michael R. Braudes,
When Constitutions Collide: A Study in Federalism in the Criminal Law Context 18 U. BALT.
L. REv. 55 (1988).
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work left to be done. The initial thrill of discovery of the existence of
state constitutional rights may have given way to the responsibility of
determining how to enforce them. The question of whether, and
under what circumstances, it is legitimate for state courts to reach con-
clusions under their state constitutions that are more protective of
rights than United States Supreme Court decisions is one of the most
important questions of American constitutional federalism.
I. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL METHODOLOGIES:
TEACHING AND SEQUENCE
In the past several decades, during which judicial federalism
came of age, state courts adopted a variety of methodologies in ap-
proaching litigants' arguments that they should be accorded more
rights under the state constitution than were currently (or were likely
to be) recognized under the Federal Constitution. One of the first
methodologies was espoused by then-Professor Hans A. Linde of the
University of Oregon School of Law.15 Linde applied his approach
when he joined the Oregon Supreme Court.16 This "primacy" ap-
proach, or "first things first" method has appealed to a number of
scholars,' 7 judges,' 8 and even to Justice John Paul Stevens of the
United States Supreme Court. 19
By contrast, a number of scholars and judges have supported
analysis of federal constitutional law first, with state constitutional law
being used as a supplementary or interstitial source of rights.2 0 Fi-
nally, others have espoused a dual sovereignty approach, in which
both constitutions are examined, and even if the state constitution is
interpreted to provide the rights sought by the litigants, the Federal
15 Hans A. Linde, Without "Due Process": Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L.
REv. 125, 133 (1970).
16 See, e.g., State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316 (Or. 1983).
17 See, e.g., JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL
RiGHTS, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES (2d ed. 1996).
18 See, e.g., Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 961-64 (Fla. 1992); R. Communica-
tions, Inc. v. Sharp, 875 S.W.2d 314, 315 (Tex. 1994); Daniel Gordon, Good Inten-
tions-Questionable Results: Florida Tries the Primacy Model 18 NOVA L. REv. 759 (1994).
19 See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 698-708 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing); see also Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 736 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
20 See, e.g., Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental
Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 708 (1983) ("The challenge is to develop a jurispru-
dence of state constitutional law, a jurisprudence that will make more predictable the
recourse to and the results of state constitutional law analysis."); Developments in the
Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HAuv. L. REv. 1326, 1361 (1982).
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Constitution is also analyzed.21 Scholars continue to catalog the dif-
ferent sequential approaches to state and federal constitutional analy-
sis, identifying more complex typologies beyond the three outlined
here.22 I have argued that it is not the sequence that matters, but rather
the focus on truly independent state constitutional interpretation, in
whatever sequence it occurs.2 3 It is substance, not form, that counts
most.
A different approach is reflected in those states in which the
highest state court has written a "teaching opinion" alerting the bar
and bench to the possibilities of independent state constitutional anal-
ysis, and educating them in the techniques of making state constitu-
tional arguments. New Jersey Justice Alan B. Handler's 1982
concurring opinion in State v. Hunt2 4 was, to my knowledge, the first
example of such an opinion, followed in 1986 by Washington's State v.
Gunwall decision. 25 To a certain extent, also, the United States
Supreme Court's opinions in the Pruneyara26 and Michigan v. Long27
cases are other examples of teaching "from above."
21 See Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 510 N.E.2d
325 (N.Y. 1987); Robert F. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Com-
ment on Federal Constitutional Issues when Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional
Grounds, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1025 (1985).
22 See generally Catherine Greene Burnett & Neil Colman McCabe, A Compass in
the Swamp: A Guide to Tactics in State Constitutional Law Challenges, 25 TEx. TECH. L. REv.
75 (1993); Wallace P. Carson Jr., Last Things Last: A Methodological Approach to Legal
Arguments in State Courts, 19 WILLAm L. REV. 641 (1983); Ronald KLL. Collins &
PeterJ. Galie, Models of Post-Incorporation Judicial Review: 1985 Survey of State Constitu-
tional Individual Rights Decisions, PuBLIus:J. FEDERALISM, Summer 1986, at 111, reprinted
in 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 317 (1986); PeterJ. Galie, Modes of Constitutional Interpretation:
The New York Court of Appeals' Search for a Roe 4 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 225
(1991) ;James C. Harrington, Framing a Texas Bill of Rights Argumen 24 ST. MARY'S L.J.
399 (1993); Robert F. Utter, Advancing State Constitutions in Court4 TRIAL, Oct. 1991, at
41; Robert F. Utter & Sanford E. Pitler, Presenting a State Constitutional Argument: Com-
ment on Theory and Technique, 20 IND. L. REv. 635 (1987).
23 See Robert F. Williams, Methodology Problems in Enforcing State Constitutional
Rights, 3 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 143, 172-73 (1986-1987); see also Thomas Morawetz, Devia-
tion and Autonomy: The Jurisprudence of Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 26
CONN. L. REv. 635, 639 n.11 (1994).
24 450 A.2d 952, 962 (NJ. 1982).
25 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986).
26 Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); see also Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986).
27 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). A survey of over 500 decisions, however, from all 50
states, between the 1983 Michigan v. Long decision and the beginning of 1988, con-
cluded that "few states have adopted a consistent, concise way of communicating the
basis for their constitutional decisions." Felicia A. Rosenfeld, Note, Fulfilling the Goals
of Michigan v. Long: The State Court Reaction, 56 FoRD HAm L. Rv. 1041, 1068 (1988);
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The most explicit teaching opinion, however, remains that writ-
ten in 1985 by the late Justice Thomas L. Hayes of Vermont in State v.
Jewett.2 8 The opinion outlined the approaches to state constitutional
interpretation (historical, textual, comparison to sibling jurisdictions,
and analysis of economic and social materials), cautioning, however,
that "[i]t would be a serious mistake for this Court to use its state
constitution chiefly to evade the impact of the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court. Our decisions must be principled, not result-
oriented."29 Justice Hayes explained the reasoning behind writing an
opinion aimed at the bar in connection with the court's order that
counsel file supplemental briefs on the state constitutional issues in
Jewett
There was some discussion on the court about publishing a law re-
view article advising lawyers to look to the state constitution, but I
had the feeling that if we took that course the article would be read
by nine students, nine law professors, and the janitor who was clean-
ing up at night at the law school. I believed an article would not get
our message across. Ultimately the court agreed that if we were to
tell our lawyers: "Look to your Vermont constitution and, when you
do, brief it adequately," we could do so only in a judicial opinion.
30
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a 1991 opinion by Justice
Ralph Cappy, has followed the approach of the Vermont Supreme
Court in Jewett, but included the teaching section within an opinion
see also Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1201 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (dis-
agreeing with Michigan v. Long) ("State courts interpreting state law remain particu-
larly well situated to enforce individual rights against the States. Institutional
constraints, it has been observed, may limit the ability of this Court to enforce the
federal constitutional guarantees .... Prime among the institutional constraints, this
Court is reluctant to intrude too deeply into areas traditionally regulated by the
States. This aspect of federalism does not touch or concern state courts interpreting
state law."); Richard W. Westling, Comment, Advisory Opinions and the "Constitutionally
Required" Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 63 TUL. L. REV. 379 (1988)
(pointing out that more cases were reinstated on state grounds after Michigan v. Long
than before the decision).
28 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985). The Vermont court reiterated this approach in State
v. DeLaBruere, 577 A.2d 254, 268 (Vt. 1990); see also State v. Zumbo, 601 A.2d 986,
988 (Vt. 1991) ("Defendant fails to provide a substantive analysis as to why the Ver-
mont Constitution should provide a different answer for his argument than the fed-
eral constitution."); State v. Jenne, 591 A.2d 85, 89 (Vt. 1991) ("Vermont's
constitutional guarantee to a fair cross-section ... does not, in this case, provide any
greater protection than that afforded by the federal constitution."); infra notes
154-57 and accompanying text.
29 Jewett, 500 A.2d at 235.
30 Thomas L. Hayes, Clio in the Courtroom, 56 VT. HisT. 147, 149 (1988); see also
State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1986).
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deciding the merits of a search and seizure case much like New
Jersey's Hunt decision.3' Teaching opinions often appear in concur-
rences,3 2 dissents,33 and in lower court opinions.3 The Wyoming
Supreme Court included, as an appendix to an opinion, a bibliogra-
phy of state constitutional law articles.35
II. THE CRTERiA APPROACH:
LOOKING FOR FACTORS TO JusTIY" DIVERGENCE
A related approach to methodology concerns, typified by New
Jersey's State v. Hunt opinion,3 6 Washington's State v. Gunwall deci-
sion,3 7 and Pennsylvania's Edmunds case,38 is the "criteria" or "fac-
tor"39 approach. Under this methodology, the state supreme court, in
what seems like a teaching opinion, sets forth a list of circumstances
(criteria or factors) under which it says it will feel justified in interpret-
ing its state constitution more broadly than the Federal Constitution.
These criteria, then, are used by advocates to present, and judges to
decide, claims made under the state constitution in cases where there
31 Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991). See generally Ken Gor-
mley, Foreword: New Constitutional Vgor for the Nation's Oldest Cour 64 TEmP. L. REv.
215, 217-19 (1991) (discussing Edmunds). Other examples of teaching opinions are
Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 961-64 (Fla. 1992); Friedman v. Commissioner of Pub.
Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1991); Immuno, AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270
(N.Y. 1991).
32 North DakotaJustice BerylJ. Levine, in a concurring opinion, called attention
to the majority's footnote indicating that only the federal constitutional issue was
before the court. She noted that "although the footnote serves as a red flag, it may
not alert the color blind," and noted the possibility of independent state constitu-
tional interpretation. State v. Thompson, 369 N.W.2d 363, 372-74 (N.D. 1985) (Le-
vine, J., concurring specially); see also State v. Wheaton, 825 P.2d 501, 504 (Idaho
1992) (Bistline, J., concurring specially); State v. Gronski, 910 P.2d 561, 565 (Wyo.
1996); Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 621 (Wyo. 1993) (Golden, J., concurring).
33 See, e.g., People v. Rister, 803 P.2d 483, 494-98 (Colo. 1990) (Quinn,J., dissent-
ing); Saldana, 846 P.2d at 624 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting); Duffy v. State, 789 P.2d 821,
847-48, (Wyo. 1990) (Urbrigkit, J., dissenting).
34 See, e.g., State v. Geisler, 594 A.2d 985, 988 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991); Wells v.
State, 348 S.E.2d 681, 684-86 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (Beasley, J., concurring specially);
Nugin v. State, 334 S.E.2d 921, 922 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (Beasley, J., concurring spe-
cially); State v. Graham, 584 A.2d 878 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); State v. Mol-
lica, 524 A.2d 1303 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); see also Williams, supra note 23, at
149 n.27.
35 Dworkin v. L.F.P., Inc. 839 P.2d 903, 920-22 (Wyo. 1992).
36 450 A.2d 952 (N.J. 1982).
37 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986).
38 Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991).
39 Steve McAllister, Comment, Interpreting the State Constitution: A Survey and Assess-
ment of Current Methodology, 35 U. KA. L. Rxv. 593, 605 (1987) ("factor analysis").
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is also a federal claim that is unlikely to prevail. On the one hand, the
criteria approach is laudable because it teaches and calls attention to
the nature of state constitutional arguments. On the other hand,
however, I have been critical of this approach for a number of reasons
that I believe have demonstrated themselves in the past fifteen years.
In Hunt, the NewJersey Supreme Court found a defendant's tele-
phone billing records to be protected from a warrantless search and
seizure under the New Jersey Constitution, diverging from a contrary
holding by the United States Supreme Court as to a pen register list-
ing of numbers dialed in Smith v. Maryland.40 Justice Handler's con-
curring opinion cautioned:
There is a danger, however, in state courts turning uncritically to
their state constitutions for convenient solutions to problems not
readily or obviously found elsewhere. The erosion or dilution of
constitutional doctrine may be the eventual result of such an expe-
dient approach.
41
It is therefore appropriate, in my estimation, to identify and
explain standards or criteria for determining when to invoke our
State Constitution as an independent source for protecting individ-
ual rights. 42
Justice Handler's concurring opinion in Hunt became the Court's ma-
jority position the next year with his opinion in State v. Williams.43 In
1987 Justice Handler, writing for the Court, stated that the state con-
stitution should be interpreted to provide greater rights than those
40 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
41 Hunt, 450 A.2d at 963-64 (Handler, J., concurring). Justice Handler noted the
possibility that state court constitutional interpretations could be overruled by state
constitutional amendments. Id. at 964 n.1 (Handler, J., concurring); see also New
Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle E. v.J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 770
(NJ. 1994) (describing origins of New Jersey criteria approach).
42 Hunt, 450 A.2d at 965 (Handler, J., concurring); see also Right to Choose v.
Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 932 (N.J. 1982) ("[W]e proceed cautiously before declaring
rights under our state Constitution that differ significantly from those enumerated by
the United States Supreme Court in its interpretation of the federal Constitution....
Our caution eminates, in part, from our recognition of the general advisability in a
federal system of uniform interpretation of identical constitutional provisions."); Pol-
lock, supra note 20, at 718 (supporting criteria).
43 459 A.2d 641, 650-51 (N.J. 1983). The Court noted that it had, in "important
cases," relied on the state constitution. "We have not hesitated to recognize and vindi-
cate individual rights under the State Constitution where our own constitutional his-
tory, legal traditions, strong public policy and special state concerns warrant such
action." Id. at 650.
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required under federal constitutional law "only when justified by
'[s]ound policy reasons."'44
The New Jersey approach, while teaching about state constitu-
tional arguments, also seems to require45 some objectively verifiable
difference between state and federal constitutional analysis-whether
textual, decisional, or historical-to justify a state court's interpreta-
tional divergence from the Federal Constitution. This view, in turn,
seems to imply that the United States Supreme Court decision is pre-
sumptively correct, and that in the absence of one or more of the
criteria identified, it is illegitimate for a state court to reject the rea-
soning or result of a Supreme Court decision in the same or similar
context. In fact, Justice Morris Pashman had written separately in
Hunt to caution against this result.46
Under this approach, a state court is compelled to focus on the
Supreme Court's decision, and to explain, in terms of the identified
criteria, why it is not following the Supreme Court precedent. 47 It is a
relationa or comparative approach, which analyzes the relationship be-
tween, or comparison of, federal and state constitutional law. The
stated criteria form a checklist of hurdles or prerequisites for the ap-
plicability of a state's highest law. A truly independent state constitu-
tional interpretation "that will stand the test of detached criticism"
4 8
is, under this approach, not enough.
44 State v. Stever, 527 A.2d 408, 415 (NJ. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 954 (1987);
see also State v. Koedatich, 572 A.2d 622, 627-28 (NJ. 1990).
45 In a law review article, Justice Handler stated: "I wrote separately in Hunt to
express my view that resort to the state constitution as an independent source for
protecting individual rights is most appropriate when supported by sound reasons of
state law, policy or tradition." Alan B. Handler, Expounding the State Constitution, 35
RUTGERS L. REv. 202, 204 (1983); see also id. at 206 n.29; Hunt 450 A.2d at 967 n.3
(Handler, concurring).
46 Hunt, 450 A.2d at 960 (Pashman, J., concurring) ("Although the factors listed
are potentially broad, they impose clear limits."); see also Right to Choose, 450 A.2d at
949 (Pashman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
47 See Robin B. Johansen, Note, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpreta-
tion of the State Constitution, 29 STA. L. REv. 297, 318 (1977) ("The court must con-
vince the legal community and the citizenry at large that it was justified in its
disagreements with the Supreme Court and that the state constitution supports differ-
ent outcomes." (footnote omitted)).
48 A. E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger
Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873, 934 (1976); see also RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THEJuDICIAL
DECISION: TOWARD A THEoRY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 159 (1961). But see Hans A.
Linde, judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE LJ. 227, 248 (1972) (citing the
importance of constitutional decisions even when they are vulnerable to academic
criticism).
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The requirement ofjustification in this manner raises several crit-
ical issues: (1) Is disagreement over substantive constitutional inter-
pretation illegitimate? (2) Does the persuasive power of Supreme
Court decisions depend upon the Court's institutional position or the
soundness of its reasoning? I argued before the Conference of Chief
Justices in 1983, and in print in 1984, that this approach attributes too
much to Supreme Court decisions.
49
The Washington Supreme Court's 1986 adoption of the criteria
approach in State v. Gunwal 0 further illustrates the problems with
this appealing, and apparently lawyer and judge-like technique.
Gunwall came three years after State v. Ringer,5' and two years after
State v. Coe,52 two decisions that generated intense criticism of the
Washington Supreme Court's state constitutional jurisprudence, and
probably contributed in part to a change in court personnel in the
1984 election.
53
Gunwall, like New Jersey's Hunt decision, dealt with the warrant-
less seizure of long-distance telephone billing records under circum-
stances where a warrant would not be required under the Federal
Constitution. Justice James A. Anderson stated as an issue the ques-
tion of when "is it appropriate for this court to resort to independent
state constitutional grounds to decide a case, rather than deferring to
comparable provisions of the United States Constitution as inter-
preted by the United States Supreme Court? '54 He answered:
49 See Williams, supra note 5.
50 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986); see also State v. Stroud, 720 P.2d 436, 444 (Wash.
1986) (Durham, J., concurring) ("We should adopt an independent analysis of Const.
art. I, § 7 on the basis of principles, not results.").
51 674 P.2d 1240 (Wash. 1983).
52 679 P.2d 353 (Wash. 1984).
53 For a general description of the 1984 Washington judicial elections, see
CHARLES H. SHELDON, A CENTURY OF JUDGING: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE WASHING-
TON SUPREME COURT 183-85 (1988); see also Robert F. Utter, The Practice of Principled
Decision-Making in State Constitutionalism: Washington's Experience, 65 TEMP. L. REV.
1153, 1159 (1992) ("Four new justices had joined the court.").
Charles Sheldon reports:
In the 1984 election for seats on the supreme court, a number of the success-
ful candidates spoke of a return to a more balanced approach to the rights
of the accused and the rights of society, indicating a reluctance to pursue
state constitutional grounds that might add to the protection afforded the
accused.
Charles H. Sheldon, "All Sail and No Anchor" in New Federalism Cases-Attempted Reme-
dial Efforts by the Supreme Court of Washington, ST. CONST. COMMENTARIES & NOTES, Win-
ter 1990, at 8, 10.
54 Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 810.
[VOL- 72:41024
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ADJUDICATION
The following non-exclusive neutral criteria are relevant in deter-
mining whether, in a given situation, the Washington State Consti-
tution should be considered as extending broader rights to its
citizens than the United States Constitution: (1) the textual lan-
guage; (2) differences in the texts; (3) constitutional history; (4)
preexisting state law; (5) structural differences; and (6) matters of
particular state or local concern. 55
These criteria are, of course, strikingly similar to those adopted in
New Jersey in Hunt, and Justice Anderson in fact credited Hunt by
citing it. The opinion treats each criterion in some depth. In this
sense, the opinion, like that in Hunt, serves an important teaching
function.
The Washington court went on to apply the criteria and conclude
that, in fact, this was a circumstance in which it would "resort" to the
state constitution to reach a conclusion different from that reached by
the United States Supreme Court. Like New Jersey, the Washington
Supreme Court rejected the United State Supreme Court's Smith v.
Maqyland 6 decision.
On the one hand, the court expressed the position that when it
decides whether to disagree with the United States Supreme Court's
interpretations of the Federal Constitution "it will consider these crite-
ria to the end that our decision will be made for well founded legal
reasons and not by merely substituting our notion of justice for that
of... the United States Supreme Court."5 7 On the other hand, how-
ever, the court characterized the factors on which it would base diver-
gence as "nonexclusive neutral criteria."58
Calls for, or application of, a criteria or factor approach have also
surfaced in other states such as Illinois,5 9 Kentucky,
6 0 Michigan, 61 Mas-
55 Id. at 811.
56 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
57 Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 813 (emphasis added).
58 Id. at 811 (emphasis added).
59 See, e.g., People v. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d 685, 690 (111. 1994) (Freeman, J.,
dissenting); People v. Levin, 623 N.E.2d 317, 328 (ll. 1993); People v. DiGuida, 604
N.E.2d 336, 342-47 (111. 1992); People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147, 155-57, 165 (Mll.
1984); see generally, Thomas B. McAffee, The Illinois Bill of Rights and Our Independent
Legal Tradition: A Critique of the Illinois Lockstep Doctrine, 12 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1 (1987);
Lawrence Schlam, State Constitutional Amending, Independent Interpretation, and Political
Culture: A Case Study in Constitutional Stagnation, 43 DEPAuL L. REv. 269 (1994).
60 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 504, 514 (Ky. 1992) (Lam-
bert, J., & Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
61 See, e.g., Sitz v. Department of State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209, 216 (Mich. 1993);
Doe v. Department of Soc. Servs., 487 N.W.2d 166, 176 n.31 (Mich. 1992); People v.
Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866, 871-74 (Mich. 1992).
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sachusetts, 62 and Connecticut.63 These calls also represent, in an im-
portant sense, a challenge to the legitimacy of independent state
constitutionalism itself64
III. STATE EXPERIENCE WITH THE CRITERIA APPROACH
After the Hunt opinion in New Jersey, the Gunwall opinion in
Washington, the Edmunds opinion in Pennsylvania, and criteria cases
in other states, one might have thought that the state constitutional
interpretation would have followed a predictable course. This was, af-
ter all, one of the primary rationales for the criteria approach. Later
cases indicate, however, that this has not happened and that the crite-
ria themselves have taken on a focus of their own.
A. Washington
In Washington, for example, in Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp.,65 in inter-
preting the state constitutional civil jury guarantee, Justice Robert Ut-
ter noted:
Chief Justice Callow relies on Gunwall and Hunt to support his im-
plication that this court should defer to Supreme Court interpreta-
tion of a comparable federal provision unless an analysis of the six
Gunwall criteria indicate that we should take an independent
course.
After criticism that the Gunwall criteria could be misinter-
preted to support the view now espoused by the dissent this court
clarified the test in State v. Wethered. In Wethered, we reemphasized
the statement that the Gunwall factors were nonexclusive and added
62 See, e.g., Guiney v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 582 N.E.2d 523, 527-28 (Mass.
1991) (Nolan, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Amendola, 550 N.E.2d 121, 127
(Mass. 1990) (Nolan, J., dissenting).
63 See, e.g., State v. Joyce, 639 A.2d 1007, 1011 n.7 (Conn. 1994); State v. Miller,
630 A.2d 1315, 1323-27 (Conn. 1993); State v. Diaz, 628 A.2d 567, 576-85 (Conn.
1993); State v. Geisler, 610 A.2d 1225, 1232-34 (Conn. 1992); State v. Linares, 630
A.2d 1340, 1353-54 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993); see also Robert I. Berdon, An Analytical
Framework for Raising State Constitutional Claims in Connecticut, 14 QUINNIPIAC L. REv.
191 (1994); Michael J. Besso, Commenting on the Connecticut Constitution 27 CONN. L.
REV. 185, 217 (1994); Martin B. Margulies, The Uses and Misuses of Histoy: A Reply to
Michael Besso, 27 CONN. L. REv. 231, 234-35 (1994); Wesley D. Dupont, Note, Automo-
bile Searches and Judicial Decisionmaking Under State Constitutions: State v. Miller, 27
CONN. L. REv. 699, 715-17, 720 (1995).
64 See infra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
65 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989).
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that they were to be used as interpretive principles of our state
constitution.
6 6
The criticism to which Justice Utter referred was a law review
Note, arguing that the criteria approach could limit independent state
constitutional interpretation. 67 This rigidity and limiting effect of the
criteria were predictable. They make it appear, as Chief Justice Keith
Callow argued in his Sofie dissent, that Supreme Court interpretations
should be followed unless one or more of the criteria are met. This is
a presumption of correctness. It makes the criteria themselves, and
their relationship to the Supreme Court decision casting the
"shadow" 68 (or shining the glare) over the state case, the focus of at-
tention rather than the question of independently interpreting the
state constitution. They can distract attention from the real issue before
the court: How is that state constitutional provision to be interpreted
and applied to the facts of this case?
In another example of this counterproductive fixation on the cri-
teria, the Washington Supreme Court held in several cases that liti-
gants must not only raise 69 state constitutional claims, but must also
brief and present arguments based on the Gunwall criteria. For example,
in Forbes v. Seattle in 1990 the court stated:
In State v. Gunwall we enumerated several nonexclusive neutral cri-
teria which must be met before this court considers state constitu-
tional analysis. As a matter of policy, examination of the Gunwall
criteria is essential in order for the process of state constitutional
analysis to be "articulable, reasonable and reasoned." Because
Forbes has failed to discuss the minimum criteria mentioned in
Gunwall, we decline to undertake a separate analysis of Const. art. 1,
§ 5 at this time. Accordingly, Forbes free speech claims will be de-
cided under federal constitutional law.
70
66 Id. at 725 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). ChiefJustice Callow had crit-
icized the majority for not utilizing the Gunwall criteria. Id. at 730. Justice Durham
dissented, in part because he did not believe Wethered in any way clarified the use of
the Gunwall criteria, nor did it respond to criticisms of the Gunwall criteria. Rather,
he contended, Wethered simply stated that state constitutional analysis required coun-
sel to brief the Gunwall criteria. Id. at 737-38.
67 Linda White Atkins, Note, Federalism, Uniformity, and the State Constitution-State
v. Gunwall, 62 WASH. L. Rav. 569 (1987) (criticizing Gunwall approach as limiting and
requiring too much focus on federal constitutional doctrine).
68 Williams, supra note 5.
69 See, e.g., Clark v. Pacificorp, 809 P.2d 176, 188 (Wash. 1991); State v. Long, 778
P.2d 1027, 1030 (Wash. 1989); State v. Herzog, 771 P.2d 739, 742 (Wash. 1989).
70 785 P.2d 431, 433-34 (Wash. 1990) (citations omitted); see also State v. Mierz,
901 P.2d 286, 292 n.10 (Wash. 1995); State v. Clark, 875 P.2d 613, 615 n.2 (Wash.
1994); Seattle v. Webster, 802 P.2d 1333, 1340 n.19 (Wash. 1990); City of Spokane v.
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This approach goes far beyond a teaching opinion, or educational ef-
fort such as Vermont's Jewett opinion, and imposes a prescriptive ap-
proach to briefing cases and presenting arguments, similar to the
prescriptive effect the criteria approach seems to have on state courts
themselves. 71 As a result, the Washington Supreme Court, over a
number of years, appears to have declined to address many important
state constitutional arguments actually raised by the parties.72
The use of the criteria approach in Washington has resurfaced
recently. In several cases which have utilized a full-blown Gunwall cri-
teria analysis, dissenters have disagreed with the way the criteria were
analyzed. For example, in State v. Gocken, the court performed an elab-
Douglass, 795 P.2d 693, 695 (Wash. 1990); State v. Motherwell, 788 P.2d 1066, 1074
(Wash. 1990); Mota v. State, 788 P.2d 538, 542 (Wash. 1990); Snedigar v. Hoddersen,
786 P.2d 781, 787-88 (Wash. 1990); Halquist v. Department of Corrections, 783 P.2d
1065, 1067-68 (Wash. 1989); State v. Carver, 781 P.2d 1308, 1312 (Wash. 1989); State
V. Jones, 772 P.2d 496, 501 n.ll (Wash. 1989); LaMon v. Butler, 770 P.2d 1027, 1038
(Wash. 1989); State v. Irizarry, 763 P.2d 432, 435-36 (Wash. 1988) (Utter, J., concur-
ring); State v. Worrell, 761 P.2d 56, 57 n.1 (Wash. 1988); State v. Reece, 757 P.2d 947,
953-54 (Wash. 1988); State v. Wethered, 755 P.2d 797, 800-01 (Wash. 1988).
71 Connecticut has not gone quite this far, but is strict with counsel. See, e.g., State
v. Zarick, 630 A.2d 565, 574 n.15 (Conn. 1993); State v. Johnson, 630 A.2d 69, 71
(Conn. 1993); State v. Tucker, 629 A.2d 1067, 1070 n.5 (Conn. 1993); State v. Wil-
liams, 629 A.2d 402, 409 n.6 (Conn. 1993) ("less than extensive analysis"); State v.
Reddick, 619 A.2d 453, 457 n.7, 462 n.22 (Conn. 1993); State v. Genotti, 601 A.2d
1013, 1021 (Conn. 1992); State v.Joly, 593 A.2d 96, 109 n.16 (Conn. 1991); State v.
Perez, 591 A.2d 119, 123-24 (Conn. 1991); Talton v. Warden, State Prison, 634 A.2d
912, 916 n.5 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993); see also Savastano v. Nurnberg, 569 N.E.2d 421,
424 n.7 (N.Y. 1990); State V. Jensen, 818 P.2d 551, 552 n.2 (Utah 1991); Wisconsin v.
Pitsch, 369 N.W.2d 711, 721 (Wis. 1985). But see State v.Joyce, 639 A.2d 1007, 1012
(Conn. 1994) ("Under appropriate circumstances, review of state constitutional
claims may be undertaken despite the failure of the defendant to brief the state con-
stitutional issue in a prior appeal."); State v. Oquendo, 613 A.2d 1300, 1307 n.6
(Conn. 1992) (although defendant's analysis of state constitution is "less than exhaus-
tive, he has clearly invoked his rights thereunder and, accordingly, we shall consider
his claim"); Robert F. Williams, Foreword: The Importance of an Independent State Constitu-
tional Equality Doctrine in School Finance Cases and Beyond, 24 CONN. L. REV. 675, 702
n.146 (1992).
According to a 1986 poll, 56 percent of the state high court judges are unwilling
to entertain state law claims that have not been raised below, and only 15 percent
favor the idea of the court raising the matter sua sponte. Ronald KL. Collins et al.,
supra note 11; see Griffin v. Eller, 922 P.2d 788, 805 (Wash. 1996) (Talmadge, J., dis-
senting) ("This Court has the inherent authority to reach constitutional issues that
determine a case.").
72 The Washington Court recently distinguished between the need to brief the
Gunwall criteria for new issues of state constitutional law but not for cases where the
court has already recognized expanded protections. State v. Hendrickson, 917 P.2d
563, 567 n.1 (Wash. 1996).
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orate Gunwall analysis in a double jeopardy context' 3 Justice Charles
Johnson dissented, arguing that the Gunwall analysis was flawed.74 Jus-
tice Barbara A. Madsen concurred in part and dissented in part, stat-
ing that Gunwall should not be treated as "a talisman." "Most
importantly, independent state constitutional analysis is lost some-
where in the ever-shifting shadow of the federal courts which are no
less political and perhaps more so than our own state courts."
75
In Richmond v. Thompson,76 the majority noted that although
"Thompson's Gunwall analysis is incomplete, amicus ACLU-W has
presented a factor-by-factor analysis, and the Court of Appeals ana-
lyzed the State Constitution." 77 It performed a complete Gunwall
analysis, rejecting a claim based on the right to petition the govern-
ment. Justice James Dolliver, dissenting, contended that the majority
had applied the criteria approach in too rigid a manner. "The court
need not fulfill every-or any-'Gunwall factor to justify a broader
reading of a parallel state constitutional provision."78
In State v. Thorne, the Washington court refused to reach a state
constitutional due process claim, because of improper Gunwall brief-
ing.79 Justice Barbara A. Madsen dissented:
Since this court has already recognized greater protection in the very
context presented in this case, it is unnecessary for the defendant to
present a Gunwall argument to receive state constitutional protec-
tion. To hold to the contrary, as the majority does, is to elevate
form over substance and to unjustly deny the defendant the protec-
tions he deserves as a Washington State citizen.8 0
B. New Jersey
In NewJersey, also, there has been dissatisfaction with the course
of state constitutional adjudication. In 1989, interestingly in another
73 896 P.2d 1269, 1270-73 (Wash. 1995).
74 Id. at 1275-81.
75 Id. at 1274-75; see also State v. Rose, 909 P.2d 280 (Wash. 1996) (not using
Gunwall analysis); State v. Johnson, 909 P.2d 293 (Wash. 1996) (using GunwaU
analysis).
76 922 P.2d 1343 (Wash. 1996).
77 Id. at 1349.
78 Id. at 1355; see also Stage v. Manussier, 921 P.2d 473, 489-90 (Wash. 1996)
(Madsen, J., dissenting); State v. Rivers, 921 P.2d 495, 507 (Wash. 1996) (Sanders, J.,
dissenting) (Gunwall approach "has been criticized for placing too much emphasis
on the United States constitution as a starting point. .. ; however, it is helpful for
present purposes").
79 921 P.2d 514, 533 (Wash. 1996).
80 Id. at 537.
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case called State v. Hunt,81 Justice Handler complained of the Court's
approach to constitutional questions in death penalty adjudications.
Its passive acceptance of the Supreme Court's lead on this funda-
mental issue is both baffling and unsettling for several reasons.
First, the Court gravely misunderstands the weight that a state
should attribute to the federal constitution with respect to the crimi-
nal law of capital-murder.... Consequently, this Court's frequent
attempts to clone the federal constitution to determine and define
critical capital-murder issues and rights is more than a doctrinal dis-
traction. It has become a major barrier to the development of a
cohesive body of substantive and procedural law to govern the pros-
ecution of these complex and unique causes.
Second, in terms of capital-murderjurisprudence, the Supreme
Court's approach boarders on the chaotic. For example, we have
only recently rejected the federal court's own shifting constitutional
analysis of what culpable state of mind is necessary in order for a
murder to rise to the level of a capital offense. We most emphati-
cally pronounced that protections under the New Jersey Constitu-
tion are different from and greater than those under the federal
Constitution. Yet, in Ramseur, on the equally important issue of fair
and impartial juries, the Court said that "the protections regarding
death qualification afforded under the New Jersey Constitution are
no different from or greater than those under the federal Constitu-
tion." It should be apparent that the Court has become engaged in
the random selection of constitutional protections, sometimes fed-
eral, sometimes state; its approach to capital-murder jurisprudence
is becoming indistinguishable from the federal approach in its lack
of consistency.
82
In none of the death penalty decisions, and there have been many in
New Jersey since capital punishment was upheld in 1987,83 is there
any extended discussion of the Hunt criteria and their application to
the variety of state constitutional issues in death penalty litigation.
84
In 1990, NewJerseyJustice Stewart Pollock noted that in deciding
a search and seizure case, even in favor of the rights claimant based
on federal constitutional law, the New Jersey Supreme Court failed to
address the state constitutional argument that had been raised.
81 558 A.2d 1259 (N.J. 1989) (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
82 Id. at 1291-92 (citations omitted).
83 See State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188 (N.J. 1987).
84 See, e.g., State v. Koedatich, 572 A.2d 622, 627-28 (N.J. 1990). For a law review
argument based on the Hunt criteria, see Edward Devine et al., Special Project: The
Constitutionality of the Death Penalty in New Jersey, 15 RuTGERS LJ. 261, 310-24, 376-93
(1984).
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Here, defendants rely not only on the fourth amendment to
the United States Constitution, but also on article 1, paragraph 7 of
the NewJersey Constitution. Like its federal counterpart, that arti-
cle of the State Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures. I believe that Court should address both parts of defend-
ants' argument. The failure to analyze defendants' state-law argu-
ment may require us to review that argument in the future if the
United States Supreme Court should agree that the dissent, not the
Court, has correctly applied federal law.
85
C. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania has also attempted an application of a criteria ap-
proach in the 1991 Edmunds" 6 decision. The Pennsylvania courts,
though, have not followed any consistent pattern. 87 Justice Nicholas
Papadakos noted in a later case, in dissent
I am dismayed also at the form of analysis of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution employed by the majority. It has been my impression for
the past year that we had set forth a dramatically new way of assess-
ing state constitutional issues, especially Article I, section 8 cases
predicated on independent state grounds. I take the central
message of Edmunds to be that mere assertions of independent state
constitutional grounds are not acceptable: no longer can the state
constitution be viewed as an all-purpose surrogate for informed
analysis, to be taken from the shelf and opened like a can of beans
to feed those who periodically hunger for answers in that docu-
ment. Instead, Edmunds mandated a structured analytical form to
be used in applicable cases.
85 State v. Lund, 573 A.2d 1376, 1385 (NJ. 1990).
86 Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991); see supra note 31 and
accompanying text. Edmunds was criticized for denigrating United State Supreme
-Court precedents by including "case-law from other states" as a factor but not men-
tioning United States Supreme Court opinions. Barry Latzer, Four Half-Truths About
State Constitutional Law, 65 TEmp. L. Rxv. 1123, 1136-37 (1992). This is, of course, a
different critique of the criteria approach from the one made here. Pennsylvania's
"horizontal federalism" criterion, however, is different from the NewJersey and Wash-
ington approach, and does focus attention somewhat away from the glare of the
Supreme Court decision.
87 See, e.g., United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. Philadelphia, 635 A.2d 612,
615-20 (Pa. 1993); Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 626 A.2d 537, 541-49 (Pa.
1993); Commonwealth v. Hess, 617 A.2d 307, 313-15 (Pa. 1992); Commonwealth v.
Lewis, 598 A.2d 975, 978-79 (Pa. 1991). Professor Ken Gormley supported the Ed-
munds criteria approach in The Pennsylvania Constitution After Edmunds, 3 WIDENER J.
PUB. L. 55 (1993).
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I believe I am quite correct in stating that we decided Edmunds
in order to guard against precisely this kind of opinion. Even as-
suming arguendo that the majority could make its case on in-
dependent state grounds (which I do not believe), there is no
evidence they have done so here. I take very little comfort in the
fact that although we adopted a significant and path-breaking analy-
sis one year ago, neither the courts below nor the majority opinion
herein have shown any recognition of its existence as precedent.
And still we wonder why our courts often are criticized for being
like little puppies who chase their own tails rather than run
forward.88
The Edmunds approach was applied as a rigid briefing require-
ment by both the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the lower courts.
8 9
Then in 1995, after a four-year experiment with the Edmunds criteria
approach, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
In Edmunds, this Court set forth certain factors that we found help-
ful in our analysis herein. We reiterate, the factors set forth are
helpful. The failure of a litigant to present his state constitutional
arguments in the form set forth in Edmunds does not constitute a
fatal defect, although we continue to strongly encourage use of that
format.9 0
Commenting on this revised approach, Pennsylvania Superior Court
Judge Phyllis W. Beck observed, "[A] s access to the court is of primary
importance to the individual, it is particularly appropriate that a liti-
gant seeking to enlarge the rights of the individual, via state constitu-
tional law, be free from a technical procedure that may not always
88 Commonwealth v. Kohl, 615 A.2d 308, 320-21 (Pa. 1992) (Papadakos, J., dis-
senting) (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 614 A.2d 1378,
1385 (Pa. 1992) (Papadakos, J., dissenting) ("Edmunds, however, mandates much
more, as I am growing weary of reminding this Court.").
89 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Morley, 681 A.2d 1254, 1257-58 (Pa. 1996); Com-
monwealth v. Breeland, 664 A.2d 1355, 1359 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995); Common-
wealth v. Herrick, 660 A.2d 51, 57 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
90 Commonwealth v. Swinehart, 664 A.2d 957, 961 n.6 (Pa. 1995); see also Com-
monwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896, 899 (Pa. 1995) (referring to dicta in Edmunds, and
noting that it "expresses the idea that it may be helpful to address the concerns listed
therein, not that these concerns must be addressed in order for a claim asserted
under the Pennsylvania Constitution to be cognizable."). Justice Frank Montemuro
concurred, but argued that the court should require, and employ, the Edmunds analy-
sis, and impose a stronger presumption in favor of following the United States
Supreme Court. Id. at 903-05.
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serve to advance the inquiry at hand."91 The Pennsylvania court con-
tinues to apply the Edmunds analysis.
92
D. Illinois
In 1984, in People v. Tisler,"9 after evaluating the state constitu-
tional argument in a search and seizure context,94 the Illinois
Supreme Court stated:
After having accepted the pronouncements of the Supreme Court
in deciding fourth amendment cases as the appropriate construc-
tion of the search and seizure provisions of the Illinois Constitution
for so many years, we should not suddenly change course and go
our separate way simply to accommodate the desire of the defend-
ant to circumvent what he perceives as a narrowing of his fourth
amendment rights under the Supreme Court's decision .... Any
variance between the Supreme Court's construction of the provi-
sions of the fourth amendment in the Federal Constitution and sim-
ilar provisions in the Illinois Constitution must be based on more
substantial grounds. We must find in the language of our constitu-
tion, or in the debates and the committee reports of the constitu-
tional convention, something which will indicate that the provisions
of our constitution are intended to be construed differently than
are similar provisions in the Federal Constitution, after which they
are patterned.95
Justice William Clark concurred specially, noting that although he
agreed with the outcome of the majority opinion, he disagreed with
the methodology.
I believe the majority's stance on this issue is dangerous be-
cause it limits our power to interpret our own State Constitution in
the future.
Under the majority's analysis, this court would be precluded
from protecting the civil liberties of Illinois citizens should the
United States Supreme Court decide to consistently favor police ef-
ficiency over the rights of the accused. Although the majority's rea-
soning may seem harmless today, it would preclude this court from
91 Phyllis W. Beck, Foreword: Stepping Over the Procedural Threshold in the Presentation
of State Constitutional Claims, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1035, 1038-39 (1995). Judge Beck had
enforced the rigid Edmunds briefing requirements in Commonwealth v. Brown, 654 A.2d
1096, 1099 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
92 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Matos, 672 A.2d 769, 772-76 (Pa. 1996).
93 469 N.E.2d 147 (Ill. 1984).
94 Id. at 155-57.
95 Id. at 157 (citations omitted); see also id. at 161-63 (Ward, J., concurring).
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protecting the individual liberties of Illinois citizens should such
protection become essential in the future. 9 6
Thus Tisler serves both as Illinois' most important teaching opinion
and the basis for its criteria approach. This debate about methodol-
ogy is still going on twelve years later in Illinois.
In 1992, for example, the Illinois court unanimously rejected a
state constitutional claim without applying the factor approach. 97
Later that same year, the court, while denying the necessity of "lock-
step" with the Supreme Court, unanimously rejected a state constitu-
tional claim after a detailed criteria analysis.9 8 In 1994, a majority of
the court found broader protection under the Illinois Constitution's
face-to-face confrontation clause, language not found in the Federal
Constitution.9 9 The dissenters argued that was not an adequate crite-
rion on which to base a different outcome from that reached by the
United States Supreme Court.10 0
Late in 1994, the disagreement over methodology began to heat
up. In People v. McCauley'0 1 the court once again rejected the lockstep
approach and held that the state constitution did not permit waiver of
self-incrimination rights where an attorney was present and seeking to
represent the defendant. In dissent, Justice Ben Miller argued that
there were no valid criteria met for divergence. 10 2 In 1995, in People v.
Mitchell'03 the court, while once again acknowledging its power to dis-
agree, rejected a state constitutional argument, relying on the Tisler
criteria approach.10 4 Justice James Heiple dissented:
Before turning to the merits of the "plain touch" doctrine, I note
my disagreement with the majority's conclusion that the Illinois
Supreme Court, in interpreting the search and seizure clause of the
Illinois Constitution, is bound to follow the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court which interpret the search and seizure clause
of the Federal Constitution. There is no reason for deference in
this area of constitutional interpretation. It would be similarly un-
96 Id. at 163-64 (Clark, J., concurring specially).
97 People v. Perry, 590 N.E.2d 454, 456 (Ill. 1992).
98 People v. DiGuida, 604 N.E.2d 336, 342-47 (Ill. 1992); see also People v. Levin,
623 N.E.2d 317, 327-28 (Ill. 1993).
99 People v. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d 685 (l. 1994).
100 Id. at 690 (Freeman, J., dissenting) ("However, there must, at least, be some
substantive basis for our departure. We have not, heretofore, found the difference in
phrasing adequate to provide such a basis.").
101 645 N.E.2d 923 (Ill. 1995).
102 Id. at 944-45 (Miller, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
103 650 N.E.2d 1014 (ll. 1995).
104 Id. at 1017 ("Certain judicially crafted limitations, however, define the exercise of
that right.") (emphasis added).
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supportable to suggest that the United States Supreme Court, in
interpreting a provision of the Federal Constitution, is bound by
decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court which interpret a similar
provision of the Illinois Constitution. Regardless of the language
employed in the two documents, they are separate and distinct.
The United States Supreme Court has the responsibility to interpret
the Federal Constitution; the Illinois Supreme Court has the re-
sponsibility to interpret its State constitution. These are nondelega-
ble duties.
Governance involves choices. Every expansion of government
power is a diminution of individual liberty. A balance must be
struck between lawlessness and personal freedom.'0 5
In two 1996 cases, the debate over application of the criteria ap-
proach escalated. In People v. Washington'0 6 the Illinois Supreme
Court disagreed with the United States Supreme Court and held that
the state constitutional due process clause required a "free-standing"
claim of innocence based on new evidence to be heard. Although
acknowledging that the tests were identical and that nothing in the
Constitutional Convention records of 1970 indicated any intent for a
different meaning, the Court rejected the lockstep approach'0 7 and
reached a result different from federal constitutional decisions. 108
Justice Miller dissented:
The majority fails to explain, as an initial matter, why the due pro-
cess clause of the Illinois Constitution should be interpreted differ-
ently from the due process clause of the United States Constitution.
Invoking the flawed decision in People v. McCauley the majority sim-
ply declares that we are under no obligation to construe provisions
of the Illinois Constitution in lockstep with the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of corresponding provisions of the
United States Constitution. Before adopting an interpretation that
varies from one given by the United States Supreme Court, how-
ever, we should seek some legitimate, objective ground for distin-
guishing the language of the state constitution from that of the
United States Constitution.
105 Id. at 1025 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
106 665 N.E.2d 1330 (Ill. 1996). For an instructive discussion of Washington, see
Michael J. Muskat, Note, Substantive Justice and State Interests in the Ajermath of Herrera
v. Collins: Finding an Adequate Process for the Resolution of Bare Innocence Claims Through
State Postconviction Remedies, 75 TEx. L. REv. 131, 160 (1996).
107 Washington, 665 N.E.2d at 1335 ("We labor under no self-imposed constraint to
follow federal precedent. . . .") (citing People v. McCauley, 645 N.E.2d 923 (1ll.
1994)); see also id. ("It is no criticism to read Herrera as a conflicted decision.").
108 See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
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Although the approach exemplified in Tisler has not been with-
out exception, it represents the better analysis, in my view, and one
that I would continue to adhere to. In the present case, the major-
ity acknowledges that the language of the federal and state due pro-
cess guarantees is identical and, further, that there is nothing in the
debates of the 1970 state constitutional convention that suggests
that the drafters intended the Illinois provision to mean something
different from its federal counterpart. The majority nonetheless
concludes that the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution
requires a different and more expansive meaning than the same
language commands under the federal constitution, and that no-
tions of procedural and substantive due process separately sustain
the defendant's action here. Neither ground is persuasive.1 0 9
Later in 1996, in People v. Krueger,"f0 the court rejected the United
States Supreme Court's "bare majority"'1 1 expansion of the good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule.112 The majority stated: "We ac-
knowledge that this court has long applied the lockstep doctrine to
follow Supreme Court decisions in fourth amendment cases. We
knowingly depart from that tradition here, for the reasons set forth
below."" 35 The court relied on the seventy-year-old Illinois exclusion-
ary rule and rejected the Supreme Court's rationale for the good-faith
exception. 1 4 Again Justice Miller dissented.
I do not agree with the majority's conclusion that the Illinois Consti-
tution forbids in this case what the United States Constitution
clearly allows.
In the present case, the majority does not point to anything in
either the text or history of our state constitution that would war-
rant this court in reaching a result different from the one reached
by the United States Supreme Court in Krdl. In the absence of a
valid ground for distinguishing the language of article I, section 6,
of the Illinois Constitution from the fourth amendment, I would
adhere to Krdl and recognize, in our own state constitution, a good-
faith exception to the exclusionary rule when searches and seizures
are conducted under statutes that are later held invalid."15
109 Washington, 665 N.E.2d at 1341-42 (Miller, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
110 675 N.E.2d 604 (Ill. 1996).
111 Id. at 610.
112 See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
113 Krueger, 675 N.E.2d. at 611 (citations omitted).
114 Id. at 612 ("Consequently, to adopt Krull's extended good-faith exception
would drastically change this state's constitutional law." (emphasis added)).
115 Id. at 613.
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E. Connecticut
Connecticut has had an experience similar to, but more recent
than, that of Washington. In 1992, in State v. Ceiser4 16 the Connecti-
cut Supreme Court embarked on criteria analysis. Since then the
court has purported to apply this criteria approach"17 and to require
counsel raising state constitutional claims to brief their arguments us-
ing Geisler criteria."18
In 1995, the court linked criteria analysis and required briefing
format:
The Geisler factors serve a dual purpose: they encourage the raising
of state constitutional issues in a manner to which the opposing
party-the state or the defendant-can respond; and they en-
courage a principled development of our state constitutional juris-
prudence. Although in Geisler we compartmentalized the factors
that should be considered in order to stress that a systematic analy-
sis is required, we recognize that they may be inextricably interwo-
ven. Finally, not every Geisler factor is relevant in all cases. 119
The Connecticut court has been very rigid on the required briefing
format based on criteria.
20
In 1993, in State v. Miller'21 the Connecticut court, engaging in
criteria analysis122 reached a result in a search and seizure case that
was more protective in the inventory search context than federal con-
stitutional law. Justice Callahan challenged the decisionmaking
process:
[I] believe that the majority is reaching to expand the scope of the
state constitution when such an expansion has scant support and
116 610 A.2d 1225, 1232-34 (Conn. 1992).
117 See, e.g., State v. Webb, 680 A.2d 147, 159 (Conn. 1996); Washington v.
Meachum, 680 A.2d 262, 275 (Conn. 1996); State v. Trine, 673 A.2d 1098, 1107 n.12
(Conn. 1996); Benjamin v. Bailey, 662 A.2d 1226, 1231 (Conn. 1995); State v.
Morales, 657 A.2d 585, 589 n.10 (Conn. 1995); State v. Linares, 655 A.2d 737, 753
(Conn. 1995); State v. Miller, 630 A.2d 1315, 1323-24 (Conn. 1993).
118 See supra note 71.
119 Morales, 657 A.2d at 589 n.10 (citations omitted).
120 See supra note 71; see also State v. Faust, 678 A.2d 910, 917 n.10 (Conn. 1996);
State v. Nixon, 651 A.2d 1264, 1267 n.4 (Conn. 1995); State v. Taheri, 675 A.2d 458,
462 n.5 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996); State v. Beliveau, 650 A.2d 591, 594 n.3 (Conn. App.
Ct. 1994). But see State v. Scarpiello, 670 A.2d 856, 862 n.8 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996)
("The defendant has failed to provide us with a separate analysis of his claim under
the Connecticut constitution, and we therefore choose not to review this claim under
the Connecticut constitution. This failure, however, does not mean that we are not
able to afford review of such a claim if we decide to do so.") (citations omitted).
121 630 A.2d 1315 (Conn. 1993); see supra note 63.
122 Miller, 630 A.2d. at 1323.
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serves no useful purpose. The majority concedes that neither textu-
ally nor historically is there any justification for the application of
the state warrant requirement to this set of facts. It, nonetheless,
discovers that Connecticut citizens are entitled to greater protection
from searches and seizures, when there is probable cause to believe
that their motor vehicles are the repositories of weapons or contra-
band, than that provided by the federal constitution.
.... The majority opinion appears to be simply a flexing of
state constitutional muscle for its own sake.
123
In 1996, though, the court once more declined to reach a claim
because of the nature of the briefing.' 24 Justice Flemming Norcott
dissented:
Although we have articulated several "tools of analysis" that are to
be considered "to the extent applicable" in construing the state con-
stitution... I have never understood these criteria to be anything
other than guidelines for the benefit of counsel, who can use them
adequately to alert us to a serious state constitutional claim and pro-
vide us with a framework within which to evaluate it. These areas of
analysis normally provide informative and even compelling sources
of authority, and the comprehensive, organized exploration of
them by the parties is of substantial benefit to the court and is to be
encouraged. I do not believe, however, that by identifying these cri-
teria, we established a rigid formula, the components of which must
be formally and specifically invoked in order for a claim to be re-
viewed, despite the functional sufficiency of the analysis presented.
To apply them as such would elevate form over substance, and in no
case decided since Geisler have we indicated that they are to be ap-
plied as technical briefing requirements. In fact, this court has
never directly and specifically delineated what constitutes a mini-
mally adequate analysis of this type of claim.'
25
Scholars have been critical of the Connecticut criteria ap-
proach.' 2 6 In Connecticut, like in the other states analyzed here, the
criteria approach itself has become the focal of state constitutional
analysis in at least some of the cases. 127 This reflects a debate over the
legitimacy of independent state constitutional law itself.
Thus in Washington the criteria approach seems to have taken on
a "life of its own" in state constitutional law cases, while in New Jersey
and Pennsylvania it does not seem to have resulted in any predictable
123 Id. at 1327, 1328 (Callahan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
124 State v. Hill, 675 A.2d 866, 875 n.23 (Conn. 1996).
126 Id. at 882-83 (Norcott, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
127 See supra note 63.
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approach to state constitutional claims.' 28 In neither instance did it
live up to its billing, and possibly has actually been counterproductive.
IV. A CASE STUDY OF CRITERIA IN ACTION:
THE NEW JERSEY AND WASHINGTON GARBAGE SEARCH CASES
In California v. Greenwood 29 the United States Supreme Court
held in a six to three decision that the Federal Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit police from seizing and searching garbage which
has been left out for collection. The Court concluded that garbage
was not protected because persons who leave it at the curb had not
"manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in their garbage that
society accepts as objectively reasonable."' 30 Interestingly, as it has
done on a number of occasions, the Supreme Court in Greenwood re-
minded us that "[i] ndividual states may surely construe their own con-
stitutions as imposing more stringent constraints on police conduct
that does the Federal Constitution."'
31
In July 1990, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the Green-
wood holding and concluded that warrantless searches of garbage are
unconstitutional under Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Con-
stitution. 3 2 Justice Robert Clifford, writing for the majority in State v.
Hempele, first analyzed the federal Greenwood case and then invoked
128 See, e.g., State v. Hamilton, 636 A.2d 760 (Conn. 1994); Miller, 630 A.2d at 1315.
129 See, e.g., State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 173, 191 (NJ. 1996); Doe v. Poritz,
662 A.2d 367, 414 (NJ. 1995) ("Although plaintiff has presented no argument for
justifying expansion of equal protection beyond the federal right in this case, we nev-
ertheless proceed with the state constitutional analysis.") (citations omitted); State v.
Smith, 637 A.2d 158, 163 (N.J. 1994); State v. Sanchez, 609 A.2d 400, 407-09 (N.J.
1992); State v. Dunne, 590 A.2d 1144, 1148 (NJ. 1991); State v. DeLuca, 527 A.2d
1355, 1357 (NJ. 1987); State v. Stever, 527 A.2d 408, 415 (NJ. 1987); State v. Hartley,
511 A.2d 80, 97-99 (N.J. 1986); State v. Pierce, 642 A.2d 947, 959-60 (NJ. 1994). For
an early analysis, see Jose L. Fernandez, Note, The NewJersey Supreme Court's Interpreta-
tion and Application of the State Constitution, 15 RUTGERS LJ. 491 (1984).
130 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
131 Id.
132 Id. at 43. The First Circuit has ruled that a homeowner has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in shredded papers set out for collection in trash bags. United
States v. Scott, 975 F.2d 927 (1st Cir. 1992); see Gordon J. MacDonald, Note, Stray
Katz: Is Shredded Trash Private? 79 CORNELL L. REv. 452 (1994). The Supreme Court's
decision in Greenwood and its approach to "legislative or social facts" (whether an ex-
pectation of privacy in one's garbage is one that society would recognize as reason-
able) is perceptively discussed in the context of state constitutional law in Neil
Colman McCabe, Legislative Facts as Evidence in State Constitutional Search Analysis, 65
TEMP. L. REv. 1229, 1240-41 (1992).
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the nautical metaphor quoted at the introduction of this Article. 3 3
Interestingly, his quote referring to United States Supreme Court de-
cisions as providing "valuable sources of wisdom for us" cited State v.
Hunt, but was from Justice Pashman's concurring opinion which dis-
agreed with Justice Handler's criteria approach and criticized it as lim-
iting and reflecting a misplaced presumption of correctness for
United States Supreme Court decisions. 3 4 Justice Clifford acknowl-
edged the textual similarity between the federal and state search and
seizure provisions. He then noted that the Supreme Court may be
"hesitant to impose on a national level far-reaching constitutional
rules binding on each and every state."' 3 5 He continued:
The Supreme Court must be especially cautious in fourth-amend-
ment cases. When determining whether a search warrant is neces-
sary in a specific circumstance, the Court must take note of the
disparity in warrant-application procedures among the several
states, and must consider whether a warrant requirement in that
situation might overload the procedure in any one state. In con-
trast, we are fortunate to have in NewJersey a procedure that allows
for the speedy and reliable issuance of search warrants based on
probable cause. A warrant requirement is not so great a burden in
New Jersey as it might be in other states.' 3 6
Justice Clifford indicated that in contrast to the federal test requiring
(1) a subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) that the expectation of
privacy be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable, the
New Jersey Constitution required simply that "an expectation of pri-
vacy be reasonable."' 3 7 He concluded that it was reasonable for peo-
ple to prefer that their garbage remain private, and that because the
133 State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1990); see Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Refuse
Disposal, Search and Seizure, and Privacy Rights in NewJersey; A Counter-Active Response to a
Federal Precedent, ST. CONST. COMMENTARIES & NOTES, Fall 1990, at 17; Stanley H. Frie-
delbaum, Supreme Courts in Conflict: The Drama of Disagreement, INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PERSPECTE, Fall 1991, at 27; Latzer, Into the '90s, supra note 13, at 26-27; Colleen D.
Brennan, Comment, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 207 (1990).
134 Hempele, 576 A.2d at 800. This is very much like Justice Pollock's observation in
1982: "Although the state Constitution may encompass a smaller universe than the
federal Constitution, our constellation of rights may be more complete." Right to
Choose v. Byme, 450 A.2d 925, 931 (N.J. 1982).
135 State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 967 (NJ. 1982); see also supra note 46 and accom-
panying text.
136 Hempele, 576 A.2d at 800 (quoting Hunt, 450 A.2d at 960 (Pashman, J.,
concurring)).
137 Id. at 800-01 (citations omitted). This seems to be an analysis of strategic con-
cerns. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
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garbage was in containers concealing their contents, people were enti-
tled to such preference.
The question of "reasonableness" in this context is one on which
reasonable people may differ. The Justices of the United States
Supreme Court differed in Greenwood. The dissenters in Hempele dif-
fered from Justice Clifford's majority opinion. The Hempele majority
differed from the Greenwood majority. The important point is that the
focus of the whole Hempele opinion was the Supreme Court's opinion
in Greenwood. The Supreme Court decision did, in fact, cast a giant
shadow over the decision in Hempele. In the final analysis, a majority
of the New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed with, and authoritatively
rejected, the majority opinion of the United States Supreme Court.
Justice Clifford concluded:
Our decision today does not follow the course set by the
Supreme Court because "we are persuaded that the equities so
strongly favor protection of a person's privacy interest that we
should apply our own standard rather than defer to the federal pro-
vision." We are aware that our ruling conflicts... [with] virtually
every other court that has considered the issue ....
... As the trial court ... so eloquently put it, "the trouble with
those cases is that they are flatly and simply wrong as the matter of the
way people think about garbage." Garbage can reveal much that is
personal. We do not find it unreasonable for people to want their
garbage to remain private and to expect that it will remain private
from the meddling of the State.138
Justice Daniel O'Hern dissented:
This case is not about garbage. This case is about the values of
federalism....
. ..The issue is the basis on which we shall depart from
Supreme Court precedent in interpreting counterpart guarantees
of our Constitution....
For me, it is not enough to say that because we disagree with a
majority opinion of the Supreme Court, we should invoke our State
Constitution to achieve a contrary result. It sounds plausible, but
one of the unanticipated consequences of that supposedly benign
doctrine of state-constitutional rights is an inevitable shadowing of
the moral authority of the United States Supreme Court. Through-
out our history, we have maintained a resolute trust in that Court as
the guardian of our liberties.
Respect for law flows from a belief in its objectivity. To the
extent possible, we ought not personalize constitutional doctrine.
138 Hempele, 576 A.2d at 801.
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When we do otherwise, we vindicate the worst fears of the critics of
judicial activism. The fourth amendment is the fourth amendment.
It ought not mean one thing in Trenton and another across the
Delaware River in Morrisville, Pennsylvania.
In truth, the constitutional vision that we have shared as a peo-
ple is not one of state-constitutional guarantees of freedom.
Whether God-given or the result of social compact, the content of
our freedom under law is drawn from the Bill of Rights. I rather
doubt that most American think otherwise.... For good or ill, this
unique American vision of freedom has been nurtured by the
United States Supreme Court. There may come a time when the
Supreme Court might abdicate its responsibility and we would have
to act, but this is surely not it. Where that Court has drawn the line
in this case does not significantly endanger our freedoms. I would
abide by its judgment. If there is a NewJersey view on this issue, the
legislature can vindicate it in time. 3 9
Justice Marie Garibaldi also dissented, based on a focus on the
United States Supreme Court's Greenwood decision. She stated: "An
examination of the 'divergence criteria' developed in State v. Hunt
and reaffirmed in State v. Williams, . . . indicates that there are no
independent state-constitutional grounds to justify our divergence
from federal law in this area.'
4
0
About four months after Hempele, the Washington Supreme Court
reached the same conclusion, rejecting Greenwood. In State v. Bo-
land,14 ' Justice James Dolliver's majority opinion referred to the
Gunwall criteria, noting:
The purpose of these factors is twofold: first, to lend assistance to
counsel where briefing might be appropriately directed in cases in
which independent state grounds are urged; and second, to help
ensure that if the court does use independent state grounds in
reaching its conclusion it will consider the six factors to the end that
the decision shall be based on well founded legal reasons and not by
merely substituting its own notion ofjustice for that of duly elected
legislative bodies or the United States Supreme Court.' 4 2
The majority found all six Gunwall criteria to be fulfilled, as an
apparent threshold matter, and then proceeded to "resort to analysis
of the issue on independent state grounds."' 43 By contrast to New
Jersey's approach, in which application of the criteria (when this ap-
139 Id. at 814-15 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
140 Id. at 815-16.
141 Id. at 817 (citations omitted).
142 800 P.2d 1112 (Wash. 1990).
143 Id. at 1114 (citation omitted).
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proach is actually used) is an integral part of resolving the question of
whether the state constitution should be interpreted more broadly
than its federal counterpart, Washington's approach appears to be a
two-stage inquiry. First, are the criteria satisfied? If all of the criteria
are satisfied, the court moves on to "independent" interpretation of
the state constitution. In Boland, Justice Dolliver concluded: "Having
found the six Gunwall criteria fulfilled in this case, we now resort to an
analysis of the issue on independent state grounds."' 4 He relied on
Gunwales analysis of the first, second, third, and fifth factors (also on
search and seizure), and therefore analyzed only the fourth and sixth
factors to reach the conclusion that all six were met.
Much of the Washington court's disagreement with the United
States Supreme Court's Greenwood decision, and added justification
beyond the New Jersey Hempele conclusion, was based on the text of
Article I, section 7 which, in contrast to the federal Fourth Amend-
ment, provides: "No person shall be disturbed on his private affairs, or
his home invaded, without authority of law." This textual analysis,
however, seems the same as analyzing the first and second criteria,
which had already taken place in Gunwall, and was accepted as appli-
cable in Boland. The court noted:
While there is an identical result in Hempele and this case, we note
one important doctrinal difference. In the dissent in Hempe, Jus-
tice Garibaldi attacks the majority opinion on federalism grounds
and argues that the test established under federal precedent more
appropriately comports with the reasonable expectation of privacy
that most New Jersey citizens have in their garbage than the test
developed by the majority. This argument has some merit in that
the language of the Fourth Amendment and article 1, section 7 of
the New Jersey Constitution are identical. The same argument,
however, does not apply when comparing Washington's constitu-
tion and the Fourth Amendment. Under Const. art. 1, § 7, the fo-
cus is whether the "private affairs" of an individual have been
unreasonably violated rather than whether a person's expectation
of privacy is reasonable.
In rendering our opinion, we acknowledge that the United
States Supreme Court has held to the contrary under the Fourth
Amendment in Greenwood. We also recognize that the opinions of
the Supreme Court, while not controlling on state courts construing
their own constitutions, are nevertheless important guides on the
subjects they squarely address. However, we decline to follow fed-
eral precedent for two reasons. First, Greenwood is based in part on
the fact the court felt society unwilling to accept as objectively rea-
144 Id.
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sonable a privacy expectation in garbage left outside the curtilage of the
home for collection. As ChiefJudge Alexander points out in his dissent
below, this court has previously held the location of a search is inde-
terminative when inquiring into whether the State has unreasonably
intruded into an individual's private affairs. Thus, the fact defend-
ant placed his garbage at the curb rather than in his backyard has
no bearing on whether an unreasonable intrusion into his private
affairs occurred. Second, the reasoning upon which Greenwood is
based conflicts directly with this court's interpretation of Const. art
I, § 7. In explaining why society was unwilling to accept an expecta-
tion of privacy in garbage, the Supreme Court analogized to Smith v.
Maryland, wherein the court held the Fourth Amendment did not
prohibit the installation of a pen register at the telephone company
for the purpose of recording telephone numbers of a criminal sus-
pect. The main reason for the court's conclusion was that a person
voluntarily conveys the numbers to the telephone company, thereby
losing all legitimate privacy expectations in the numbers. However,
we held to the contrary in Gunwall .... 145
It seems from this analysis that Washington constitutional law ar-
guably protects against searches of a person's garbage regardless of
what the United States Supreme Court held in Greenwood. The use of
criteria, though, reorients the focus from Washington constitutional
text and doctrine, to a comparison of such state constitutional text
and doctrine to federal constitutional law. This is a relational ap-
proach. If a claim is properly made under a state constitution, why
would the court bother to discuss what federal constitutional law or
the United States Supreme Court would conclude about the problem?
In Boland, Justice Richard Guy dissented: "I disagree that the fac-
tors set forth in State v. Gunwall have been met. Therefore there is no
basis upon which the majority can conclude that a broader interpreta-
tion of privacy rights, under article 1, section 7 of the Washington
State Constitution is warranted."' 46 The rest of the dissenting opinion
consisted of disagreement on the majority's findings with respect to
the Gunwall criteria. Therefore, Justice Guy argued there was no basis
on which the majority could conclude that garbage searches were pro-
tected by the Washington Constitution. He argued that the Gunwall
criteria were adopted to "ensure that resort to independent state
grounds will be based on well founded legal reasons and not by substitu-
tion of a court's own notion ofjustice for that of... the United States
Supreme Court." 47 Justice Guy therefore ascribed an explicit pre-
145 Id.
146 Id. at 1116-17 (citations omitted).
147 Id. at 1118 (citation omitted).
[VCOL- 72:41044
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ADJUDICATION
sumption of correctness to the United States Supreme Court decision
(Greenwood), with the criteria operating to limit contrary results under
the state constitution. This approach is exactly what New Jersey Jus-
tice Pashman warned of in State v. Hunt in 1982, and for which the
dissenters in New Jersey's I-empele case argued. Majority and dissent
here focus on their disagreement on the application of the criteria rather
than on the content and application of the state constitutional provi-
sion at issue. Is a dissenter's accusation that the majority has misap-
plied the criteria any different from an accusation that the majority
has simply resorted to the state constitution. in a result-oriented at-
tempt to "evade" United States Supreme Court precedent?
148
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 49 the Colorado
Supreme Court,1 50 the Connecticut Supreme Court,' 51 the North Da-
kota Supreme Court 52 and the Indiana Supreme Court, 55 decided to
uphold garbage searches and followed the United States Supreme
Court's Greenwood decision. The Massachusetts decision was unani-
148 Id. at 1120 (citations omitted). For an analysis of Boland, together with a criti-
cism of the Gunwall criteria, see James W. Talbot, Comment, Rethinking Civil Liberties
Under the Washington Constitution, 66 WASH. L. REv. 1099 (1991). Justice Utter de-
fended the approach in Utter, supra note 53; see also Kelly Kunsch, Washington State
Constitutional Research: A Recipefor a Gunwall Analysis, 49 WASH. ST. B. NEWS 31 (1995)
(October issue).
149 See Williams, supra note 5. He writes:
[S] tate judges may be particularly sensitive, and even defensive, to charges
that their decisions are result oriented or that their disagreement with the
Supreme Court is based purely on ideological differences. These charges
are typically leveled by dissenters or by those who merely disagree with the
state court's substantive result. Nevertheless, these are the kinds of pressures
that have forced state courts to develop standards or criteria by which to
justify an independent state constitutional interpretation which arguably
conflicts with a prior Supreme Court interpretation of a similar or identical
federal constitutional provision.
Id. at 357-58 (footnotes omitted).
150 Commonwealth v. Pratt, 555 N.E.2d 559, 567-68 (Mass. 1990); see Latzer, Into
the '90s, supra note 13, at 27 ("Hempele will probably receive much more attention in
the literature than Pratt.. . ."). The Massachusetts Court also held that garbage in a
dumpster on commercial property was protected from warrantless searches. Com-
monwealth v. Krisco Corp., 653 N.E.2d 579 (Mass. 1995).
151 People v. Hillman, 834 P.2d 1271 (Colo. 1992).
152 State v. DeFusco, 620 A.2d 746 (Conn. 1993). One commentator reported that
there was negative media reaction to the decision, but that an attempt to overturn the
decision by a proposed constitutional amendment failed in the legislature. Ann R.
Johnson, Note, State v. DeFusco: Warrantless Garbage Searches Under the Connecticut Con-
stitution, 14 QuiNmPIAC L. REv. 143, 171 n.210, 171-72 (1994).
153 State v. Rydberg, 519 N.W.2d 306 (N.D. 1994); see also State v. Carriere, 545
N.W.2d 773 (N.D. 1996) (reaffirming Rydberg).
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mous, with no discussion of the state cases disagreeing with Greenwood.
The Colorado decision was four to three, with the majority and dis-
senting opinions analyzing out-of-state cases and law review literature,
as well as the Greenwood opinions, both majority and dissent. The Con-
necticut decision was three to two, and like Colorado, contained a full
exploration of both the federal and state cases. The North Dakota
case was unanimous, and acknowledged the other state cases but fol-
lowed the federal result. The Indiana case was closely divided and
also contained a complete treatment of both the federal and state
cases.
In 1996, the Vermont Supreme Court, in a three to two decision,
followed New Jersey and Washington, rejecting the United States
Supreme Court's Greenwood decision.' 54 The majority analyzed both
the federal and the state cases. Justice John Dooley's dissent stated
that he "strongly agree[d] with the creation of an independent state
constitutional jurisprudence that keeps essential decisions about pro-
tected liberties as much as possible within Vermont."' 55 He quoted
from the Vermont Court's famous State v. Jewett decision 156 in support
of a criteria approach, concluding that the majority opinion was a "re-
stated Greenwood dissent."
1 57
V. REASONS TO DiSTRUST THE CRITERIA APPROACH
The truth is that reasonable people-judges, lawyers, political ob-
servers, and citizens-can reasonably differ over whether people's tel-
ephone toll billing records or their garbage should be vulnerable to
warrantless police searches. They can disagree about most other con-
stitutional questions. There is simply no clear or plain constitutional
guidance. The debate is about people's view of the reasonableness of
citizens' expectation of privacy in these things. But it is not a valid
argument to say that a state constitution should not be interpreted to pro-
vide against such warrantless searches because the United States
Supreme Court has already held that the Federal Constitution is not vio-
lated by such searches, based on its national view of "reasonableness."
At its core, the criteria approach is based on a notion that inter-
pretations of the Federal Constitution can somehow authoritatively set
the meaning for similar provisions of state constitutions. Justice Ste-
vens has referred to this presumption of correctness as evidence of a
154 Moran v. State, 644 N.E.2d 536 (Ind. 1995).
155 State v. Morris, 680 A.2d 90 (Vt. 1996).
156 Id. at 106 (Dooley, J., dissenting).
157 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
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"misplaced sense of duty."158 Justice Linde referred to it as the "non
sequitur that the United States Supreme Court's decisions under such
a text not only deserve respect but presumptively fix its correct mean-
ing also in state constitutions." 159 State supreme court justices' views
of "reasonableness," though, particularly only within their own states,
are just as valid as those of United States Supreme Courtjustices. Of
course the decisions of the United States Supreme Court deserve a
careful, respectful reading. But only when state judges are convinced
by their reasoning should they adopt them. 60 As Justice Linde noted:
This court like others has high respect for the opinions of the
Supreme Court, particularly when they provide insight into the ori-
gins of provisions common to the state and federal bills of rights
rather than only a contemporay "balance" of pragmatic considerations
about which reasonable people may dffer over time and among the several
states.'
6 1
The United States Supreme Court decisions in Smith v. Maryland and
Greenwood v. California, both rejected by the New Jersey and Washing-
ton courts, as well as other state courts, reflect the sort of "contempo-
rary 'balance' of pragmatic considerations about which reasonable
158 Morris, 680 A.2d at 104 (Dooley, J., dissenting); see also State v. Read, 680 A.2d
944, 951-53 (Vt. 1996) (applying Jewett as a criteria requirement).
159 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 699 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160 State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1322 (Or. 1983); see also State v. Flick, 495
A.2d 339, 343 (Me. 1985) (quotingJustice Linde); WilliamJ. Brennan,Jr., State Consti-
tutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HAv. L. REv. 489 (1977). Justice Bren-
nan writes:
The essential point I am making, of course, is not that the United States
Supreme Court is necessarily wrong in its interpretation of the Federal Con-
stitution, or that ultimate constitutional truths invariably come prepackaged
in the dissents, including my own, from decisions of the Court. It is simply
that the decisions of the Court are not, and should not be, dispositive of
questions regarding rights guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state
law.... Rather, state court judges, and also practitioners, do well to scruti-
nize constitutional decisions by federal courts, for only if they are found to
be logically persuasive and well-reasoned, paying due regard to precedent
and the policies underlying specific constitutional guarantees, may they
properly claim persuasive weight as guideposts when interpreting counter-
part state guarantees.
Id. at 502.
161 See Brennan, supra note 159; Frederic S. Le Clercq, The Process of Selecting Consti-
tutional Standards: Some Incongruities of Tennessee Practice, 61 TENN. L. REv. 573 (1994);
Ronald L. Nelson, Welcome to the "Last Frontier" Professor Gardner: Alaska's Independent
Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation, 12 ALASKA L. REv. 1 (1995); Edmund B.
Spaeth,Jr., Toward a New Partnership: The Future Relationship of Federal and State Constitu-
tional Law, 49 U. Prrr. L. REv. 729, 741 (1988).
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people may differ" that Justice Linde was describing. Such decisions
are not entitled to a presumption of correctness when a state court
interprets its own constitution. The criteria approach, as articulated
most clearly in NewJersey and Washington, and as applied in practice,
seems to result in such a presumption of correctness. Although in the
recent garbage search cases, majorities on both the Washington and
NewJersey courts did disagree with the Supreme Court's decision, the
criteria approach (most pronounced in Washington) shifts the debate
away from analyzing the state constitution to a preoccupation with the
shadow cast by the United States Supreme Court decision. For these
reasons, the emerging criteria approach, while very appealing to law-
yers and judges, is one that should be avoided because the underlying
premise on which it is based is invalid. Decisions of the United States
Supreme Court declining to recognize rights should not be accorded
special weight in state constitutional interpretation. They should not
carry any presumptive validity.
The type of criteria, factors, and standards listed by the New
Jersey, Washington, and Pennsylvania justices and other commenta-
tors reflect circumstances under which state courts have interpreted
their constitutions to provide more extensive rights than their federal
counterpart. 62 They properly serve as important guides for scholars,
courts, and advocates. But they should not serve as limitations on
state court authority to disagree with Supreme Court constitutional
analysis even if none of the factors are present. A state high court has
the duty, in interpreting the supreme law of the state, to adopt a rea-
soned interpretation of its own constitution despite what the United
States Supreme Court has said when interpreting a different constitu-
tion under different institutional circumstances.' 63
Wisconsin Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson, in discussing the
garbage search cases, 164 addressed the still controversial question of
162 Kennedy, 666 P.2d at 1321 (emphasis added). For an exhaustive analysis of
balancing in constitutional interpretation, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional
Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE LJ. 943 (1987).
163 See., e.g., A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the
Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873, 934-44 (1976); Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional
Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 169, 185-95 (1983); Kent M. Williams, Note,
Property Rights Protection Under Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution: A Ration-
ale for Providing Possessory Cimes Defendants with Automatic Standing to Challenge Unrea-
sonable Searches and Seizures, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1255, 1273-1300 (1991).
164 See Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 1289 (Pa. 1979) ("As we believe
that Miller establishes a dangerous precedent, with great potential for abuse, we de-
cline to follow that case when construing the state constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures.").
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disagreement between state judges and the United States Supreme
Court.
But should not different opinions about individual rights in search
and seizure cases be expected and accepted?
Differences in interpretation of the state and federal constitu-
tions should be viewed, I believe, as examples of the difficulties of
interpreting language, especially the broad phrases of a bill of
rights....
We accept division of opinion within the United States
Supreme Court on interpretations of constitutional language....
Why should state courts not closely examine a federal decision to
determine whether it is sufficiently persuasive to warrant adoption
into state law?"
165
These views recognize the legitimacy of a reasoned difference of
opinion, not as a "mere" result-oriented disagreement, but rather as
the product of honestly held alternative ways of looking at a problem
of constitutional interpretation and the consequences of resolving it
in a certain way. This attitude has to include rejection of the criteria
approach. Former Justice Joseph Grodin of California has made a
similar point, 66 as have others.
167
Other commentators, however, have called for the criteria ap-
proach.' 68  For example, Professor James A. Gardner, in his well-
165 Abrahamson, supra note 7, at 725-33.
166 Id. at 731.
167 Joseph R. Grodin, Commentary: Some Reflections on State Constitutions, 15 HAS-
TINGS CONsT. L.Q. 391 (1988). He writes:
The presence of distinctive language or history obviously presents the most
comfortable context for relying upon independent state grounds. In the
absence of such factors, however, state courts are still obliged to find mean-
ing in the provisions of the state constitutions. And... neither logic nor
history requires that they accord state constitutional language the same
meaning as the United States Supreme Court has accorded a comparable
provision of the federal Constitution.
Id. at 400; see also Peter Linzer, Why Bother with State Bills of Rights?, 68 TEx. L. REv.
1573, 1584-85, 1607-08, 1610 (1990).
168 See, e.g., G. Alan Tarr, Constitutional Theory and State Constitutional Interpretation,
22 RUTGERS LJ. 841 (1991). He writes:
[R] ather than blindly following federal precedent, state judges should inde-
pendently seek their own best interpretation of their state constitutions.
This does not mean that they should altogether ignore federal rulings-they
may be adopted or rejected, depending on their inherent persuasiveness.
But when state judges forthrightly assert their own perspectives, it is argued,
the result is a healthier and more vibrant federalism.
Id. at 849; see also id. at 847 n.24, 854-55.
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known 1992 article, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism,169 crit-
icized state constitutional decisions for not utilizing a "'discourse of
distinctness'.., a language and set of conventions enabling partici-
pants in the legal system to argue that provisions in the state constitu-
tion mean something different from their federal counterparts."170 This issue
is the most important component of the ongoing discussion of legiti-
macy in state constitutional interpretation. 17 1
The garbage search cases involve a disagreement about people's
reasonable expectation of privacy. Justice Abrahamson reports that
she conducted "her own unscientific survey of Wisconsinites' views on
garbage." The "general consensus" was that one's garbage is private.
"These views raise questions about how a court determines society's
reasonable expectation of privacy."1 72 Simply to say that protection
under a state constitution may be more extensive than under the Fed-
eral Constitution begs the question of what those protections should
and will be. The highest state courts decide what the state constitu-
tion means. The dialogue should be on the meaning of the state con-
stitution itself, rather than on comparing it with, or relating it to, the
Federal Constitution. 173 The current, relational or criteria-based dia-
logue is focused on the wrong question. Justice Abrahamson's forth-
right recognition of the real locus of discretion in the state high
courts is refreshing.
169 See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, The Mysterious Creation of Search and Seizure Exclusionay
Rules Under State Constitutions: The Utah Example, 1993 UTAH L. REv. 751; George
Deukmejian & Clifford K. Thompson,Jr., All Sail and No Anchor-Judicial Review Under
the California Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975, 987-96 (1979); James W.
Diehm, New Federalism and Constitutional Ciminal Procedure: Are We Repeating the Mis-
takes of the Past?, 55 MD. L. REv. 223 (1996); Paul S. Hudnut, State Constitutions and
Individual Rights: The Case for Judicial Restraint, 63 DENV. U. L. REV. 85 (1985); Pollock,
supra note 20, at 718; Steven J. Twist & Len L. Munsil, The Double Threat of Judicial
Activism: Inventing New "Rights" in State Constitutions, 21 Amiz. ST. LJ. 1005, 1030-32
(1989); Robin B. Johansen, Note, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation
of the State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REv. 297 (1977).
170 James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MIcH. L. REv.
761 (1992).
171 Id. at 778 (emphasis added); see also id. at 804 ("[A] discourse of distinctiveness
[is] a way of explaining differences between the state and federal constitutions."). For
an opinion relying on Gardner's critique, calling for criteria, see State v. Canelo, 653
A.2d 1097, 1112 (N.H. 1995) (Thayer, J., dissenting).
172 For the latest discussion, see Robert M. Piter, Independent State Search and
Seizure Constitutionalism: The New York State Court of Appeals' Quest for Principled Decision-
making, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1996).
173 Abrahamson, supra note 7, at 729 n.26. Justice Abrahamson considered the
problem of "legislative facts" concerning the expectation of privacy in State v. Rewolin-
ski, 464 N.W.2d 401, 414 n.1 (Wis. 1990) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
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Professor Niel McCabe has characterized the garbage search
cases as reflecting differences of opinion among federal and state
courts about "legislative or social facts"-whether society views as rea-
sonable a person's expectation of privacy in his garbage. 7 4 Obviously,
state courts interpreting their own state constitutions may make find-
ings on such legislative or social facts that differ from a federal court's
findings under the Federal Constitution.
In addition to what has already been pointed out with respect to
the differences in text and history between the federal and state con-
stitutions, there are a number of other reasons why the presumption
of correctness and its resulting criteria approach is a mistake. Others
as well as myself have reviewed these reasons elsewhere. 175 In sum-
mary, though, there may not be any federal decisions on point to em-
ulate. 76 In Professor Lawrence Sager's "underenforcement thesis"'77
he demonstrates that the United States Supreme Court often under-
enforces the Federal Constitution out of deference to the states. 78
Thus, federal decisions should hardly be viewed as limiting the inter-
pretation of state constitutional provisions through the presumption
of correctness approach.
Professor Sager's "strategic concerns thesis" is another argument
against the presumption of correctness. 79 Pointing to the substantial
174 Linde, supra note 1.
175 McCabe, supra note 131, at 1245-51.
176 See Robert F. Williams, A "Row of Shadows: Pennsylvania's Misguided Lockstep Ap-
proach to Its State Constitutional Equality Doctrine, 3 WmENmR J. PUB. L. 343, 374-79
(1993); Williams, supra note 5; Williams, supra note 23; Williams, supra note 71, at
696-701.
177 In striking down an attempt to amend the California Constitution to require
the state constitutional criminal procedure provisions to be interpreted in lockstep
with federal guarantees, the California Supreme Court observed:
As a practical matter, ultimate protection of criminal defendants from depri-
vation of their constitutional rights would be left in the care of the United
States Supreme Court. Moreover, the nature and extent of state constitu-
tional guarantees would remain uncertain and undeveloped unless and until
the high court had spoken and clarified federal constitutional law.
Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1087 (Cal. 1990).
178 Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitu-
tional Norms, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1212, 1218-20 (1978).
179 Professor Sager writes:
While there is no litmus test for distinguishing these norms, there are indicia
of underenforcement. These include a disparity between the scope of a fed-
eral judicial construct and that of plausible understandings of the constitu-
tional concept from which it derives, the presence in court opinions of
frankly institutional explanations for setting particular limits to a federal ju-
dicial construct, and other anomalies ....
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role of "strategic" considerations in judicial enforcement of constitu-
tional norms, Sager identified the possibility of state and federal
courts employing different "strategies" in constitutional interpreta-
tion. State courts, interpreting their own constitutions, may see the
need to employ different strategies, even though they are applying
similar "norms of political morality." Sager concluded:
State judges confront institutional environments and histories that
vary dramatically from state to state, and that differ, in any one state,
from the homogenized, abstracted, national vision from which the
Supreme Court is forced to operate. It is natural and appropriate
that in fashioning constitutional rules the state judges' instrumental
impulses and judgments differ.
In light of the substantial strategic element in the composition
of constitutional rules, the sensitivity of strategic concerns to varia-
tions in the political and social climate, the differences in the regu-
latory scope of the federal and state judiciaries, the diversity of state
institutions, and the special familiarity of state judges with the actual
working of those institutions, variations among state and federal
constitutional rules ought to be both expected and welcomed.' 80
Under these circumstances, the "jurisdictional redundancy"' 8' of a
state constitutional "second look' 82 at constitutional questions makes
sense.' 8 3 The adoption of different "strategies" in state and federal
constitutional interpretation may, as in the search and seizure cases,
Id. at 1218-19.
180 Professor Sager asked, "[T]o what extent, if any, should state judges faced with
claims under provisions of their state constitutions feel themselves bound to defer to
Supreme Court interpretations of equivalent federal constitutional provisions?" Law-
rence Gene Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the Norms and
Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959, 959 (1985); see also Linzer, supra note
166, at 1580 ("The gut issue, though, is how closely the state courts should follow
federal precedents in applying their states' provisions."); David Schuman, Advocacy of
State Constitutional Law Cases: A Report from the Provinces, 2 EMERGING IssuES ST. CONST.
L. 275 (1989).
181 Sager, supra note 179, at 975-76; see also Robert B. Keiter, An Essay on Wyoming
Constitutional Interpretation, 21 LAND & WATER L. REV. 527, 535 (1986) (discussing the
institutional reasons for the United States Supreme Court's narrow view of standing
and concluding that, "[t]hese institutional differences between the federal and state
courts suggest that active judicial review of public law issues at the state level is not as
troublesome theoretically as it is at the federal level"); Lawrence G. Sager, Some Obser-
vations About Race, Sex, and Equal Protection, 59 TUL. L. REv. 928, 936-58 (1985).
182 Robert M. Cover, The Uses ofJurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Inno-
vation, 22 WM. & MA'YL. REV. 639 (1981). The concept of redundancy is common to
the understanding of federal systems. See Martin Landau, Federalism, Redundancy and
System Reliability, PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM, Fall 1973, at 173, 187-96.
183 Williams, supra note 5, at 361.
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reflect a difference of opinion about a "contemporary 'balance' of
pragmatic considerations."
184
Professor Louis Bilionis noted that "the constitutionally significant
facts may be different at the state and federal levels .... Indeed, when-
ever a constitutional methodology admits a need to accommodate in-
stitutional considerations, the possibility for different yet equally
correct state and federal results exists." 85 By way of example, he cited
the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis in search and seizure
cases. 186 A state court's view of "constitutionally significant facts"
could certainly differ from the United States Supreme Court's view,
thus yielding a different outcome.
Recently Professor Paul Kahn argued in favor of an independent
state constitutional interpretation, not tied to "unique state sources,"
as part of the shared national enterprise of constitutional interpreta-
tion because, in such matters, there can be no absolute truth. Kahn
argued:
[I] abandon the central premise of most previous works, namely,
that the interpretation of a state constitution must rely on unique
state sources of law. Those sources include the text of the state con-
stitution, the history of its adoption and application, and the
unique, historically identifiable qualities of the state community.
State constitutional law, it is assumed, can diverge from federal law
only if the differences can be traced to one of these sources.
The doctrine of unique state sources dominates the recent
literature.... That there should be an intersection between state
authority and federal sources is ruled out in advance. This intersec-
tion, however, is just the position for which I want to argue. It is the
position that many state courts find themselves moving toward, not
only because of the meager state sources available, but also because
state constitutional debate cannot close its eyes to the larger discur-
sive context within which it finds itself.
The doctrine of unique state sources is an approach to constitu-
tional interpretation that rests upon two unexamined assumptions.
First, it assumes that differences in the narrow constitution-the
formal text and its history-of each state reflect differences in each
state's larger constitution. Second, it assumes that constitutional ad-
judication is a matter of presenting what already exists within those
184 See Sager, supra note 179. But see Earl M. Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court
Activim, 63 Tax. L. REv. 995 (1985).
185 State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1321 (Or. 1983) (Linde, J.).
186 Louis D. Bilionis, On the Sigrficance of Constitutional Spirit, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1803,
1808-09 (1992); see also McCabe, supra note 131 ("legislative or social facts").
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state sources. Both assumptions reflect a fear that the only alterna-
tive to an interpretation based upon unique state sources is national
uniformity. Interpretive diversity within a common enterprise, how-
ever, represents a third possibility that dissipates the fear and under-
mines the assumptions.
Of course, different courts can and will reach different conclu-
sions about the meaning of such constitutional values.
187
The criteria, or presumption of the validity of the federal inter-
pretation approach is, almost by definition, inconsistent with Profes-
sor Kahn's views.
Justice Robert Utter of Washington, a supporter of the criteria
approach, criticized the use of a lockstep approach to interpreting
that state's equality provisions, labelling such an approach a virtual
"rewrite" of the state constitution without a constitutional convention
or the people's consent.' 8 8
These factors make it particularly important for state courts to
look first to their own constitutional provisions, and judicial doctrines
which pre-date incorporation of federal Bill of Rights provisions. Sec-
ondly, they must look to state constitutional decisions in other juris-
dictions for further guidance. As I have earlier argued, United States
Supreme Court decisions rejecting asserted federal constitutional
rights should persuade state courts confronting similar claims under
their state constitutions only by their reasoning, discounted for feder-
alism or strategic concerns, or any other type of deference to the
states. The decisions should not be followed merely because of the
United States Supreme Court's institutional position as the highest
court in the land for the resolution of federal constitutional claims.18 9
The relational, criteria approach starts from the federal prece-
dent and considers the question of deviation. Independent state con-
stitutional interpretation is based on state court autonomy. Professor
Thomas Morawetz explained this distinction:
On one hand, many judges write as if congruence with the federal
rule is the norm, and deviation from the federal norm is an excep-
tion that needs to be justified in the light of special reasons. Judges
who proceed from this assumption differ among themselves about
the kinds of reasons that warrant deviation. On the other hand,
many judges imply that autonomy from federal interpretations of
187 Bilionis, supra note 185, at 1808-09.
188 Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARv. L.
REV. 1147, 1147, 1152-53, 1160, 1161 (1993) (footnote omitted); see also Pitier, supra
note 171, at 236.
189 State v. Smith, 814 P.2d 652, 661 (Wash. 1991) (Utter, J., concurring).
(VOL. 72:41054
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ADJUDICATION
federal law is the norm and that congruence between the federal
and the state standard is, at best, coincidence.
Thus, from the standpoint of power and authority, it is appro-
priate to see state courts as needing tojustify deviation from the fed-
eral norm, to justify expanding a right. But from the standpoint of
interpretive responsibility, state courts are necessarily autonomous,
committed by the very nature of the judicial task to offering a com-
pelling account of the rights in question, an account that may or
may not dovetail with the federal understanding. 190
Professor Morawetz referred to the Connecticut criteria analysis' 9 ' as
the "smorgasbord" approach.
192
VI. A CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY AND METHODOLOGY IN STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE
For federal constitutional law, the primary legitimacy concern has
involved the relation between the United States Supreme Court and
other purportedly more democratic branches, such as Congress or
state legislatures. For state constitutional law, in contrast, the major
legitimacy concern has involved the relation between state courts
and the U.S. Supreme Court: when can a state court interpret its
state guarantees to reach a result different from that obtained by
the Supreme Court interpreting the Federal Constitution?19
The criteria cases discussed earlier reflect a fundamental debate
about the legitimacy of independent state constitutional interpreta-
tion in cases where there are also similar or identical federal constitu-
tional guarantees. Despite repeated assurances by the United States
Supreme Court itself 194 that the practice is unexceptional, the legiti-
macy debate continues to rage. It is a central question of constitu-
tional theory, albeit one of state rather than federal constitutional
theory. These legitimacy questions in state cases "evading"
95
190 See Williams, supra note 5, at 396-97; Williams, supra note 23, at 168-70.
191 Thomas Morawetz, Deviation and Autonomy: The Jurisprudence of Interpretation in
State Constitutional Law, 26 CONN. L. REV. 635, 638-39, 657 (1994).
192 See supra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
193 Morawetz, supra note 190, at 644.
194 Tan-, supra note 167, at 853.
195 See supra note 131 and accompanying text. As early as 1945 in Chase Securities
Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945), the United States Supreme Court had
advised:
We are reminded that some state courts have not followed it [a United States
Supreme Court decision] in construing provisions of their constitutions sim-
ilar to the due process clause. Many have, as they are privileged to do, so
interpreted their own easily amendable constitutions to give restrictive
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Supreme Court precedent have led some state courts, as described
earlier, to attempt to formulate standards or criteria by which to justify
their rejection of Supreme Court decisions.' 96 This development has
been followed by a more disturbing development.
Recent state court decisions all over the country continue the de-
bate reflected in the garbage search decisions and in the Hunt,
Gunwall and Edmunds criteria or factor lines of cases. Split high courts
in New York,197 Texas, 98 California, 99 Michigan, 200 Massachusetts,
20'
and Kentucky, 20 2 while deciding important substantive state constitu-
tional questions and serving an important teaching function, also dis-
puted methodology questions and the situations in which it is
legitimate for state courts to diverge from United States Supreme
Court precedent.
The New York Court of Appeals had exhibited some tendencies
toward the criteria approach as a limiting doctrine.20 3 In People v. P.f
Video, Inc.,204 for example, the court distinguished between "interpre-
clauses a more rigid interpretation than we properly could impose upon
them from without by construction of the federal instrument which is
amendable only with great difficulty and with the cooperation of many
States.
Id. at 312-13 (footnote omitted).
196 See Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., More on the New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky.
LJ. 873, 873 n.2 (1975) (referring to "evasion" cases); Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., The New
Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421
(1974).
197 This search is not really new. See Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 82 P.2d 391, 393
(Cal. 1938) ("[C]ogent reasons must exist before a state court in construing a provi-
sion of the state constitution will depart from the construction placed by the Supreme
Court of the United States on a similar provision in the federal constitution."); see also
People v. Disbrow, 545 P.2d 272, 283-84 (Cal. 1976) (Richardson, J., dissenting);
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 376 N.E.2d 582, 583 (Ohio 1978); State v.
Florance, 527 P.2d 1202, 1209 (Or. 1974).
198 People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1992).
199 Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1992); see also Ex parte Tucci, 859
S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1993); Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Walker, 834 S.W.2d 54 (Tex. 1992). Dav-
enport is discussed in Hans A. Linde, State Constitutions Are Not Common Law: Comments
on Gardner's Failed Discourse, 24 RUTGERS LJ. 927 (1993).
200 Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 809 P.2d 809 (Cal. 1991). See generally
Mark R. Drozdowski, Comment, Building Castles Out of Sands: An Analysis of the Compet-
ing Adjudicative Models Used By the California Supreme Court in Sands v. Morongo Unified
School District, 40 UCLA L. REv. 253 (1992); see also Linde, supra note 198, at 940.
201 People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. 1992).
202 Guiney v. Police Comm'r, 582 N.E.2d. 523 (Mass. 1991).
203 Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
204 See Galie, supra note 22, at 234; see also Daniel C. Kramer & Robert Riga, Accept-
ance and Rejection of State Constitutional Authority in Civil Liberties Decisions: A Sampling of
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five" and "non-interpretive" state constitutional construction, but both
approaches sounded like the relational, criteria approach:
If the language of the State Constitution differs from that of its Fed-
eral counterpart, then the court may conclude that there is a basis
for a different interpretation of it .... Such an analysis considers
whether the textual language of the State Constitution specifically
recognizes rights not enumerated in the Federal Constitution;
whether language in the State Constitution is sufficiently unique to
support a broader interpretation of the individual right under State
law; whether the history of the adoption of the text reveals an inten-
tion to make the State provision coextensive with, or broader than,
the parallel Federal provision; and whether the very structure and
purpose of the State Constitution serves to expressly affirm certain
rights rather than merely restrain the sovereign power of the State.
A non-interpretive analysis attempts to discover, for example, any
pre-existing State statutory or common law defining the scope of
the individual right in question; the history and traditions of the
State in its protection of the individual right; any identification of
the right in the State Constitution as being one of peculiar State or
local concern; and any distinctive attitudes of the State citizenry to-
ward the definition, scope or protection of the individual right.
20 5
Despite these indications of the criteria approach, however, the New
York court has not adhered to it in any predictable or uniform way.208
Methodological problems other than the criteria approach, such as
the sequence of state and federal constitutional analysis, and whether
to engage in both, have also been handled in different ways by the
New York court.207 These issues came to a head in 1992 in a full de-
bate over the legitimacy of independent state constitutional interpre-
Findings in the New York Court of Appeals, ST. CONST. CoMMENTARIES & NOTES, Winter
1992, at 13.
205 501 N.E.2d 556 (N.Y. 1986). Professor Robert M. Pitler has provided a thor-
ough and illuminating analysis of New York's experience with the criteria approach.
See Pitler, supra note 171, at 185-322.
206 P.j Video, 501 N.E.2d at 560.
207 See, e.g., People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054 (N.Y. 1990). In Dunn, the New York
Court of Appeals disagreed with the United States Supreme Court and concluded
that a "canine sniff' in a hallway was a search under the New York Constitution, but in
this case concluded that the search was based on reasonable suspicion. Two judges
concurred in the result, but stated that they would not hold that there was a search.
The majority did not rely on the criteria approach.
In several other cases, however, the Court has referred to the P.J. Video "general
rules governing independent State review .. " People v. Harris, 570 N.E.2d 1051,
1053 (N.Y. 1991); People v. Reynolds, 523 N.E.2d 291, 293 (N.Y. 1988); see Vincent
Martin Bonventre, Court of Appeals-State Constitutional Law Review, 1991, 14 PACE L.
Rrv. 353, 357-69 (1994) (discussing Hanis).
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tation. In People v. Scott and People v. Keta,208 decided together, the
New York Court of Appeals disagreed with the United States Supreme
Court in rejecting, respectively, the "open fields" doctrine and the
"administrative search" exception in search and seizure cases. Judge
Joseph Bellacosa, with Judge Richard Simons and Chief Judge Sol
Wachtler in agreement, wrote a bitter, accusatorial dissent aimed at
both the substance and methodology of the majority opinions.20 9
The doctrine that State courts should interpret their own State Con-
stitutions, where appropriate, to supplement rights guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution is not in dispute. Indeed, we have shown our
support for that doctrine where appropriate with our votes in a long
line of cases .... We do strenuously disagree with the Court, how-
ever, that the doctrine is being "cautiously exercised" . . . and be-
lieve that the applications of the doctrine here create a sweeping,
new and unsettling interpretation-not mere application of settled
principles.
210
Judge Bellacosa considered the majority view a mere disagreement
with the United States Supreme Court, after which "New York's adju-
dicative process is left bereft of any external or internal doctrinal disci-
plines."211 The majority, in his view, had simply "superimpose[d] its
preferred view of the constitutional universe." 212
Judge Judith Kaye concurred with the majority opinions to ad-
dress the methodological issues raised byJudge Bellacosa.21 3 Her ob-
servations justify careful consideration:
208 Immuno, A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y. 1991). In Immuno,
Judge Simons, criticizing the majority's methodology of deciding both the federal and
state constitutional issues, stated: "As Judge Kaye notes... neither the Court nor its
individual Judges have consistently followed any announced standards for departing
from Federal law to adopt a different State rule or settled on any preferred methodol-
ogy for doing so." Id. at 1286 n.2 (Simmons, J. concurring) (citations omitted).
209 593 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1992). See generally Luke Bierman, Horizontal Pressures
and Vertical Tensions: State Constitutional Discordancy at The New York Court of Appeals, 12
TouRo L. REV. 633 (1996); Eve Cary & Mary R. Falk, People v. Scott & People v. Keta:
"Democracy Begins in Conversation", 58 BRooy. L. REv. 1279 (1993); Pitler, supra note
171, at 218.
210 Scott, 593 N.E.2d at 1348-49 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) ("Simply stated, the
common issue is whether this Court has a justifiable basis, within its recently rearticu-
lated method of noninterpretative analysis, to apply New York's mirror equivalent to
the Fourth Amendment ... differently from the United States Supreme Court in
these cases.").
211 Id. at 1356 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
212 Id. (citations omitted).
213 Id.; see also id. at 1348-49 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). Such attacks on independ-
ent state constitutional interpretation are not new. See Williams, supra note 5, at
357-58.
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The dissent in this case is distinctive only in the tone of its expres-
sion, most especially its accusation that the Court's legal conclusions
and analysis are the product of ideology, simply the imposition of a
personally preferred view of the constitutional universe ....
First, however much we might consider ourselves dispensing
justice strictly according to formula, at some point the decisions
we make must come down to judgments as to whe-
ther ... constitutional protections we have enjoyed in this State
have in fact been diluted by subsequent decisions of a more recent
Supreme Court. In that no two cases are identical, it is in the nature
of our process that in the end a judgment must be made as to the
application of existing precedents to new facts. To some extent that
has taken place in the two cases before us .... We may disagree in
our application of precedents, but our considered judgment hardly
justifies attack for lack of principle, or for overthrowing stare
decisis.
Second, I disagree with the dissent that, in an evolving field of
constitutional rights, a methodology must stand as an ironclad check-
list to be rigidly applied on pain of being accused of lack of princi-
ple or lack of adherence to stare decisis. We must of course be
faithful to our precedents, as I believe we are in the cases now
before us. But where we conclude that the Supreme Court has
changed course and diluted constitutional principles, I cannot
agree that we act improperly in discharging our responsibility to
support the State Constitution when we examine whether we should
follow along as a matter of State law-wherever that may fall on the
checklist.
Time and again in recent years, the Supreme Court as well as
its individualJustices have reminded State courts not merely of their
right but also of their responsibility to interpret their own Constitu-
tions, and where in the State courts' view those provisions afford
greater safeguards than the Supreme Court would find, to make
plain the State decisional ground so as to avoid unnecessary
Supreme Court review.
The Supreme Court is not insulted when we do so.
2 14
In those instances where we have gone beyond Supreme Court
interpretations of Federal constitutional requirements, our objec-
tive has been the protection of fundamental rights, consistent with
our Constitution, our precedents and own best human judgments
in applying them.
2 15
214 See Scott, 593 N.E. 2d at 1346 (Kaye, J., concurring).
215 Id. at 1346-47 (Kaye, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see Vincent Martin
Bonventre, New York's ChiefJudge Kaye: Her Separate Opinions Bode Well for Renewed State
Constitutionalism at the Court of Appeals, 67 TEmp. L. REv. 1163, 1192-96 (1994).
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This frank, on-the-bench assessment of the human difficulties ofjudg-
ing complex controversies, based on general state and federal consti-
tutional phrases like "unreasonable search and seizure," is refreshing.
It mirrors Justice Abrahamson's off-the-bench discussion of the same
problem.2
16
Of the New York dissenters, in fact, at least two had described
independent state constitutional law in glowing terms in off-the-bench
writings.217 In this light, it seems just as likely that the dissent was "re-
sult oriented" as was the majority. The charge of a result-oriented de-
cision can be made in this context only when one makes the United
States Supreme Court decision the starting point, or referent, for legal
reasoning. As Judge Kaye pointed out, it was not the effect of result
orientation, but the exercise of independent judicial judgment that
drove the majority.
In the Texas case, striking down an overly broad gag rule, Justice
Lloyd Doggett's seventy-footnote treatise on independent state consti-
tutional analysis, generally and with specific reference to Texas, was
met with a concurring opinion by Justice Nathan Hecht. His concur-
rence leveled a broad attack on reliance on the state constitution
where there was relevant federal free speech doctrine that would ar-
216 Scott, 593 N.E.2d at 1348 (Kaye, J., concurring). For a similar case in New
Hampshire, see State v. Canelo, 653 A.2d 1097 (N.H. 1995). Justice W. Stephen
Thayer's dissent stated that the court's independent approach to state constitutional
analysis does not "give us permission to invent new constitutional protections that
some may argue are based on the whim of the majority." Id. at 1112 (Thayer, J.,
dissenting). Justice William Johnson concurred specially: "Such heightened rhetoric
adds nothing to the jurisprudence of our State. I know of no one on this court-and,
I stress, no one-who decides the cases that come before us on a whim." Id. at 1106
(Johnson, J., concurring).
In a 1987 dissent, Justice Thayer had made the following point, after criticizing
the majority for deciding a case on state constitutional grounds without discussing a
contrary United States Supreme Court decision:
Our citizens are entitled, and indeed have the right, to seek redress under
our State Constitution. However, when interpreting the State Constitution,
this court's analysis should, at the very least, distinguish United States
Supreme Court decisions concerning the same issue, especially if an incon-
sistent holding results. The citizens of this State are entitled to know when
their State Constitution is being interpreted in such a way as to give individu-
als accused of crimes greater rights than these same individuals are given
under the Federal Constitution, because our citizens have the constitutional
right to correct the imbalance, if they wish, by constitutional revision.
State v. Denney, 536 A.2d 1242, 1250 (N.H. 1987).
217 Abrahamson, supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also Beck, supra note 91,
at 1038.
io6o [VOL. 72:4
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ADJUDICATION
guably support the same outcome.2 18 These opinions taken together,
provide a very sophisticated treatment of the current issues in judicial
federalism. But, they focus on legitimacy concerns that should not
still be bothering, state courts. This debate is still going on in Texas. 219
In the California case, involving prayers at public school gradua-
tion, the court held that such prayers were constitutionally impermis-
sible.220 The five separate opinions, however, disagreed not only as to
the merits but also as to the methodology to be employed in cases
raising both state and federal constitutional claims. 221 Chief Justice
Malcomb Lucas concurred, but argued that the state constitutional
claim should not be reached until the United States Supreme Court
had resolved the federal constitutional issue.222 He supported the no-
tion of "deference" to Supreme Court decisions, and departure from
them only for "cogent reasons."223 Justice Stanley Mosk also con-
curred, but reasoned that state constitutional claims should be
reached before federal claims. 224 The dissenting justices analyzed the
state constitutional claims.
225
The Michigan case involved the state constitution's "cruel orunu-
sual" punishments clause and imposition of a mandatory life sentence
without parole for possession of 650 grams of cocaine. 226 Here, by
contrast to the Texas and California cases, the United States Supreme
Court had already upheld the Michigan life sentence statute.2 27 The
Michigan court struck down the penalty, though, observing that the
Supreme Court decision was only "persuasive authority" for state con-
stitutional interpretation, and that "we may in some cases find more
persuasive, and choose to rely upon, the reasoning of the dissenting
justices of that Court .... ,"228 Justice Michael Cavanagh's majority
opinion held itself to a "compelling reason"229 standard for disagree-
ment with the Supreme Court, but found such compelling reasons to
218 Joseph W. Bellacosa, A New York State Constitution: A Touch of Class, 59 N.Y. ST.
B.J. 14 (April 1987); Sol Wachtler, Our Constitutions-Alive and Well, 61 ST.JOHN'S L.
RPv. 381 (1987); see also Piter, supra note 171, at 231 n.909.
219 Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 24-45 (Tex. 1992) (Hecht, J., concurring).
220 See In reJ.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1994).
221 Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 809 P.2d 809, 810, 820 (Cal. 1991).
222 Id. at 821, 835.
223 Id. at 822, 833 (Lucas, C.J., concurring).
224 Id. at 834 (quoting Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1088 (Cal. 1990)).
225 Id. at 836 (Mosk, J., concurring).
226 Id. at 853-58, 863-64.
227 People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866, 867 (Mich. 1992).
228 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
229 Bullock, 485 N.W.2d at 870.
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be present.230 This seems like the criteria approach. Justice Dorothy
Riley wrote a partial dissent, reasoning that compelling reasons had
not been shown sufficiently to justify departure from the Supreme
Court decision. 2
31
This debate has continued in Michigan. 232 For example, in 1996
in People v. Bender,233 the Michigan court held that a confession must
be suppressed where an attorney is present and seeking to advise the
defendant and the police fail to inform the defendant of this situa-
tion, thus rejecting United States Supreme Court precedent.234 The
majority declined to apply its "compelling reasons" standard to estab-
lish a "conclusive presumption artificially linking state constitutional
interpretation to federal law." 235 Justice Patricia Boyle dissented:
Today, without a single foundation in the language, historical con-
text, or the jurisprudence of this Court, a majority of the Court en-
grafts its own "enlightened" view of the Constitution of 1963, art. I,
§ 17, on the citizens of the State of Michigan. With nothing more
substantial than a disagreement with the United States Supreme
Court as the basis for its conclusion, a majority of the Court ignores
our obligation to find a principled basis for the creation of new
rights and imposes a benefit on suspects that will eliminate volun-
tary and knowledgeable confessions from the arsenal of society's
weapons against crime.
.... Although we have repeatedly concluded that our constitu-
tion should be interpreted differently only if there is a compelling
reason for doing so ... the lead opinion is not hindered by tradi-
tional principles of constitutional interpretation.
236
The Massachusetts case dealt with random drug testing of police
officers. 237 Like the Michigan case, the federal constitutional issue
had been answered against the rights claimants, in federal litigation
230 Id. at 871.
231 Id. at 872-77.
232 Id. at 880, 883-89 (Riley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
233 See, e.g., People v. Mezy, 551 N.W.2d 389, 394 (Mich. 1996); People v. Cham-
pion, 549 N.W.2d 849, 852-53 n.3 (Mich. 1996); Kivela v. Department of Treasury,
536 N.W.2d 498, 502-04 (Mich. 1995).
234 551 N.W.2d 71 (Mich. 1996).
235 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986). In Moran, the United States Supreme
Court had noted that "[niothing we say today disables the States from adopting differ-
ent requirements for the conduct of its employees and officials as a matter of state
law." Id. at 428.
236 Bender, 551 N.W.2d at 79 n.17 (quoting Sitz v. Department of State Police, 506
N.W.2d 209 (Mich. 1993)).
237 Id. at 84, 86 (Boyle, J., dissenting).
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involving the same litigants.23 8 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, despite the federal ruling, struck down the random drug test-
ing under the state constitution in an opinion by Justice Herbert
Wilkins.2
39
Justice Joseph Nolan's dissenting opinion criticized the majority
for finding "some hidden meaning" in the state constitution, without
"any standard used to deviate from the position of the Supreme
Court."24° Justice Nolan asserted the lack of "compelling reasons" and
the absence of "any coherent rationale for this court to disagree with
the Supreme Court."241 This is a call for the criteria approach.
As these recent cases in New Jersey, Washington, New York,
Texas, California, Michigan, Massachusetts, and Kentucky show, the
legitimacy questions associated with independent state constitutional
analysis, by contrast to the merits of the outcome of the case under
the state constitution, are still argued vigorously. The relational ap-
proach still dominates.
VII. CONCLUSION
The presumption of correctness relegates state constitutional
protections to "a mere row of shadows."242 These were the words of
Justice David H. Souter while serving on the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire. Justice Souter observed:
It is the need of every appellate court for the participation of the
bar in the process of trying to think sensibly and comprehensively
about the questions that the judicial power has been established to
answer. Nowhere is the need greater than in the field of State con-
stitutional law, where we are asked so often to confront questions
that have already been decided under the National Constitution. If
we place too much reliance on federal precedent we will render the
State rules a mere row of shadows;, if we place too little, we will render
State practice incoherent. If we are going to steer between these ex-
tremes, we will have to insist on developed advocacy from those who
bring the cases before us.
2 4 3
State constitutional provisions need not, and should not, be re-
duced to a "row of shadows" through too much reliance on federal
precedent. Swinging the pendulum in the other direction, however,
238 Guiney v. Police Comm'r, 582 N.E.2d 523, 524 (Mass. 1991).
239 Guiney v. Roache, 873 F.2d 1557 (1st Cir. 1989).
240 Guiney, 582 N.E.2d at 525-26.
241 Id. at 527 (Nolan, J., dissenting).
242 Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Cast, 556 N.E.2d 69, 79 (Mass. 1990)).
243 State v. Bradberry, 522 A.2d 1380, 1389 (N.H. 1986) (Souter, J., concurring
specially).
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where too little reliance on federal precedent will "render State prac-
tice incoherent," is also unnecessary. It does not make sense to advo-
cate "zero-based" state constitutional interpretation, 244 with no
reference at all to United States Supreme Court interpretations of the
Federal Constitution on similar questions. But their overwhelming
gravitational pull must be counteracted. With some informed atten-
tion to constitutional texts, history, and the lessons of federalism-
aided by the insights of practicing and academic lawyers245-state
courts can and should have coherent, independent doctrines sur-
rounding their state constitutional provisions.246
In 1986, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., commented that the
"[r] ediscovery by state supreme courts of the broader protections af-
forded their own citizens by their state constititions ... is probably the
most important development in constitutional jurisprudence in our
time."24 7 This development is still unfolding and will require the best
thinking of all of us involved with state constitutional law.
244 Id. (emphasis added).
245 Maurice Kelman, Foreword: Rediscovering the State Constitutional Bill of Rights, 27
WAYNE L. REV. 413, 429 (1981).
246 "Any defense lawyer who fails to raise an Oregon Constitution violation and
relies solely on parallel provisions under the federal constitution... should be guilty
of legal malpractice." State v. Lowry, 667 P.2d 996, 1013 (Or. 1983) (Jones,J., concur-
ring specially).
Justice Brennan had the following advice for lawyers: "I suggest to the bar that,
although in the past it might have been safe for counsel to raise only federal constitu-
tional issues in state courts, plainly it would be most unwise these days not also to raise
the state constitutional questions." Brennan, supra note 159, at 502.
247 Oregon Justice Hans A. Linde said that in order "to make an independent
argument under the state clause [it] takes homework-in texts, in history, in alterna-
tive approaches to analysis." Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States'
Bills of Rights, 9 U. BAIT. L. REv. 379, 392 (1980).
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